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BOUNTIES FOR BAD BEHAVIOR:  REWARDING 
CULPABLE WHISTLEBLOWERS UNDER THE 
DODD-FRANK ACT AND INTERNAL REVENUE 
CODE 
Jennifer M. Pacella∗ 
In 2012, Bradley Birkenfeld received a $104 million bounty reward 
from the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) for blowing the whistle on his 
employer, UBS, which facilitated a major offshore tax fraud scheme.  
Birkenfeld does not fit the mold of the public’s common perception of a 
whistleblower.  He was himself complicit in this crime and even served 
time in prison for his involvement.  Despite his conviction, Birkenfeld was 
still eligible for a sizable whistleblower bounty under the IRS 
Whistleblower Program, which only excludes from reward eligibility those 
convicted of “planning and initiating” the underlying action.  In contrast, 
the whistleblower program of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) precludes rewards for any whistleblower 
convicted of a criminal violation that is “related to” a securities 
enforcement proceeding.  Therefore, because of his conviction, Birkenfeld 
would not have been granted a bounty under Dodd-Frank had he blown the 
whistle on a violation of the federal securities laws rather than a tax 
violation.  This Article will explore an area that has been void of much 
scholarly attention—the rationale behind providing bounties to 
whistleblowers with unclean hands and the differences between federal 
whistleblower programs in this regard.  After analyzing the history of these 
federal programs and the public policy concerns associated with rewarding 
culpable whistleblowers, this Article will critique the IRS’s practice of 
including the criminally convicted among those eligible for bounty awards 
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by giving focus to alternative whistleblower incentive structures, such as 
leniency and immunity.  This Article will suggest that the SEC’s approach 
represents a reasonable middle ground that reconciles the conflict between 
allowing wrongdoers to benefit from their own misconduct and 
incentivizing culpable insiders to come forward, as such persons often 
possess the most crucial information in bringing violations of the law to 
light. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The public’s perception of whistleblowers has evolved drastically in 
recent years.  Traditionally perceived as “snitches,” “rats,” or even “crazy,” 
whistleblowers have increasingly emerged as heroes possessing the 
courage to address corporate wrongdoing.1  The emerging importance of 
 
 1.  See, e.g., Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Terry Morehead Dworkin, Timothy L. Fort & 
Cindy A. Schipani, Integrating Trends in Whistleblowing and Corporate Governance:  
Promoting Organizational Effectiveness, Societal Responsibility, and Employee 
Empowerment, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 177, 189–90 (2002) (discussing public policy’s maturation 
in favor of whistleblowing); Geneva Campbell, Snitch or Savior? How the Modern Cultural 
Acceptance of Pharmaceutical Company Employee External Whistleblowing is Reflected in 
Dodd-Frank and the Affordable Care Act, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 565, 571–75 (2013) 
(discussing the recent distrust of corporations as one reason for an increased sense of 
acceptance of whistleblowers); Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix:  The 
Comparative Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting 
Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1159 (2010) (stating that “[i]n the past, popular culture has 
generally portrayed whistle-blowers as ‘lowlife[s] who betray[] a sacred trust largely for 
personal gain.’  In recent years, however, the act of whistle-blowing has been reshaped in 
the media as a heroic act that can bring deeply corrupt practices to a halt.”); Jonathan 
Macey, Getting the Word Out about Fraud:  A Theoretical Analysis of Whistleblowing and 
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whistleblowers as a source of essential information in fraud detection has 
changed the way in which they are viewed by society.  In 2002, Time 
magazine named three whistleblowers as persons of the year––Sherron 
Watkins of Enron, Coleen Rowley of the FBI, and Cynthia Cooper of 
WorldCom––each of whom disclosed information pertaining to major 
corporate wrongdoing within their organizations.2  More recently, in 2013, 
Time chose National Security Agency whistleblower Edward Snowden as 
runner-up for person of the year, naming him “the doomsayer of the 
information age.”3 
Whistleblowing has been described “as an institution” and as one of 
the most notable developments in corporate governance and law 
enforcement in recent decades.4  Today, tips from whistleblowers account 
for over 40 percent of all reported occurrences of occupational fraud.5  The 
role of whistleblowers in fraud detection is crucial, as insiders have the 
most accurate access to information about misconduct and wrongdoers’ 
attempts to hide their behavior.6  It has been argued that many of the 
financial scandals of the twenty-first century could have been avoided if 
established and effective whistleblowing programs had been prevalent, 
 
Insider Trading, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1899, 1901 (2007) (noting that whistleblowing has 
recently become “fashionable,” garnering a rise in popularity after historically being viewed 
with suspicion); Robert A. Prentice & Dain C. Donelson, Insider Trading as a Signaling 
Device, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 63 (2010) (acknowledging the distinct popularity of recent 
whistleblowers who possess “that patina of near-sainthood”); Matt A. Vega, Beyond 
Incentives:  Making Corporate Whistleblowing Moral in the New Era of Dodd-Frank Act 
“Bounty Hunting,” 45 CONN. L. REV. 483, 491 (2012) (noting that the public perception of 
whistleblowers has transformed from “morally suspect” to heroic). 
 2.  Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year:  Cynthia Cooper, Coleen 
Rowley and Sherron Watkins, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, http://content.time.com/time/magazine/ 
article/0,9171,1003998,00.html. 
 3.  Michael Scherer, Edward Snowden, The Dark Prophet, TIME, Dec. 11, 2013, 
http://poy.time.com/2013/12/11/runner-up-edward-snowden-the-dark-prophet/. 
 4.  Vega, supra note 1, at 485; see Richard Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Whistleblower 
Provisions:  Ten Years Later, 64 S.C. L. REV. 1, 4 (2012) (stating that Sarbanes-Oxley was a 
successful model for whistleblower law). 
 5.  See FREDERICK D. LIPMAN, WHISTLEBLOWERS: INCENTIVES, DISINCENTIVES, AND 
PROTECTION STRATEGIES 2 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2012) (discussing contemporary 
changes in whistleblower regulations). 
 6.  See, e.g., Justin Tyler Hughes, Equity Compensation and Informant Bounties:  How 
Tying the Latter to the Former May Finally Alleviate the Securities Fraud Predicament in 
America, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1043, 1062 (2009) (claiming that many corporate scandals of 
2002 were exposed due to inside tips); Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? 
The Attempt to Reform Wall Street by the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank 
Act, 2012 BYU L. REV. 73, 83–85 (2012) (stating that OSHA employees may lack the 
necessary training to act as gatekeepers under Sarbanes-Oxley). 
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which would have allowed information to flow directly to the boards of 
directors without the risk of management misleading directors.7 
Whistleblowers have uncovered some of the most significant 
injustices pertaining to social, financial, environmental, and economic 
issues, attaining heroic status in the minds of many and highlighting a 
moral element to whistleblowing.  Given the enormous risks that potential 
whistleblowers face in their careers and the perception of disloyalty to 
colleagues that reporting is likely to convey, the decision to blow the 
whistle is often an ethical one.8  There are many emotional and social 
hurdles to reporting information about one’s colleagues and friends, and 
whistleblowers have commonly described their experience as a 
“‘nightmare,’ and a venture ‘fraught with dangers and risks.’”9  
Whistleblowers often face retaliation for their efforts, such as exclusion 
from work activities, verbal abuse, lack of promotions or raises, and 
relocation or reassignment.10  Often, whistleblowers are ignored or labeled 
as crazy, vengeful, or unworthy of being taken seriously, despite the fact 
that the information they have to offer may indeed be true.11 
Given the admirable status that whistleblowers have recently attained 
in society, what should we make of whistleblowers who are themselves 
complicit in the wrongdoing that they are reporting?  This question 
becomes even more complex when considering that whistleblowers with 
 
 7.  LIPMAN, supra note 5, at 2. 
 8.  See Lili Levi, Dangerous Liaisons:  Seduction and Betrayal in Confidential Press-
Source Relations, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 609, 710 n.363 (1991) (noting that scholars have 
described the decision to blow the whistle as an ethical duty that involves moral issues given 
the conflict with the notion of organizational loyalty). 
 9.  Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for 
Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91, 118 
(2007) (citing Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 61 (2002) and Leonard 
M. Baynes, Just Pucker and Blow?: An Analysis of Corporate Whistleblowers, the Duty of 
Care, the Duty of Loyalty, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 875, 882 
(2002)). 
 10.  LIPMAN, supra note 5, at 63–65. 
 11.  See, e.g., Barbara Ettore, Whistleblowers:  Who’s the Real Bad Guy? 83 MGMT. 
REV. 18 (1994) (claiming that more than half of whistleblower reports are ignored); Rapp, 
supra note 6, at 118 (asserting that although negative views of whistleblowers may be 
prevalent, that does not mean that the whistleblower “has not spotted genuine and serious 
fraud”); John-Paul Ford Rojas, Banker Labelled ‘Crazy Miss Cokehead’ after 
Whistleblowing, Tribunal Hears, TELEGRAPH, Feb. 28, 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ 
finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/9898708/Banker-labelled-Crazy-Miss-Cokehead-
after-whistleblowing-tribunal-hears.html (describing how a whistleblower was harassed at 
work); Jack Welch & Suzy Welch, Whistleblowers: Why You Should Heed Their Warnings, 
FORTUNE, May 29, 2012, http://fortune.com/2012/05/29/whistleblowers-why-you-should-
heed-their-warnings (“In the vast majority of cases whistleblowers are, to some degree, 
crazy or vengeful or both.  Until one terrible, awful day when, speaking out of vengefulness 
or ethical earnestness, the whistleblower also happens to be telling the truth.”). 
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unclean hands are not precluded from receiving bounties or cash rewards 
for providing information to either the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) or the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) about 
securities law and tax law violations.  There are differences, however, 
between the two programs’ treatment of culpable whistleblowers.  Under 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-
Frank”), the SEC may pay bounty awards to whistleblowers who 
voluntarily provide original information that leads to an SEC enforcement 
action in an amount between 10 and 30 percent of the total monetary 
sanctions collected in that action.12  The SEC denies bounties to certain 
types of whistleblowers, including “any whistleblower who is convicted of 
a criminal violation related to the judicial or administrative action for 
which the whistleblower otherwise could receive an award . . . .”13 
Although securities whistleblowers who are also convicted criminals 
are excluded outright from receiving a bounty, the SEC still makes 
bounties available for those who are complicit in the wrongdoing, although 
the SEC may decrease an award depending on the whistleblower’s 
involvement.14  In deciding whether to give a bounty on the lower end of 
the scale, the SEC will consider factors such as the whistleblower’s role in 
the securities violation, whether the whistleblower acted with scienter, the 
egregiousness of the fraud committed by the whistleblower, and the 
timeliness of the report.15 
In contrast to the SEC’s complete preclusion of bounties for convicted 
criminals, the IRS takes a broader approach to its tax whistleblower 
program, which was amended in 2006 under the Tax Relief and Healthcare 
Act to enhance the long-standing ability of the IRS to reward informants.  
While the IRS has a long history of rewarding individuals who provide it 
with information pertaining to others’ violations of the Internal Revenue 
 
 12.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1) (2012 & Supp. I 2013).  The language of Dodd-Frank 
pertaining to bounties reads as follows:   
In any covered judicial or administrative action, or related action, the 
Commission . . . shall pay an award or awards to 1 or more whistleblowers who 
voluntarily provided original information to the Commission that led to the 
successful enforcement of the covered judicial or administrative action, or 
related action, in an aggregate amount equal to (A) not less than 10 percent, in 
total, of what has been collected of the monetary sanctions imposed in the action 
or related actions; and (B) not more than 30 percent, in total, of what has been 
collected of the monetary sanctions imposed in the action or related actions.   
Id. 
 13.  Id. § 78u-6(c)(2)(B) (emphasis added). 
 14.  17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(b)(1) (2014).  The culpability of the whistleblower is just 
one of the criteria that the SEC will consider in determining the bounty amount.  
 15.  Id. 
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Code (“IRC”),16 the 2006 amendments to the IRS whistleblower program 
introduced mandatory bounties, rather than discretionary, thereby 
increasing the availability and size of rewards for tax whistleblowers.17  
These amendments also recognized that tax whistleblowers may 
themselves be culpable, but nevertheless allowed for bounties to be paid to 
whistleblowers who are convicted of tax law violations, with one caveat:  
the whistleblower’s conviction must not be based on a role in which such 
person “planned and initiated” the underlying action.18  Therefore, the 
IRS’s preclusion of bounties for criminals is only applicable if the tax 
whistleblower played a leadership role in the wrongdoing and was 
convicted because of that specific role. 
This Article will analyze the differences between the SEC and IRS 
whistleblower programs, specifically with respect to the issue of granting 
bounties to culpable and convicted whistleblowers––an area lacking in 
scholarly attention.  Section I will begin this comparison by examining the 
IRS whistleblower program, including its long-established bounty program 
and the 2006 amendments that made the program what it is today.  This 
Section will also explore the newly-enacted SEC whistleblower program, 
its defining characteristics, including its basis on the IRS bounty 
structure,19 and how the program differs from that model. 
Section II will provide an in-depth examination of whistleblower 
Bradley Birkenfeld’s story––from his conviction for his role in UBS’s 
offshore tax fraud scheme to his receipt of a $104 million bounty from the 
IRS for blowing the whistle on UBS.  This Section will also explore why 
whistleblowers with unclean hands should never be disregarded as sources 
of key information pertaining to violations of the law. 
Section III will offer criticism of the IRS whistleblower program’s 
inclusion of those who are criminally convicted as eligible for bounty.  This 
Section will suggest that the existence of alternative whistleblower 
incentive structures, such as leniency and immunity, are more appropriate 
for a potential whistleblower facing a criminal conviction, especially in 
light of Bradley Birkenfeld’s motivation to come forward with his 
 
 16.  See Karie Davis-Nozemack & Sarah Webber, Paying the IRS Whistleblower:  A 
Critical Analysis of Collected Proceeds, 32 VA. TAX. REV. 77, 82–83 (2012) (describing the 
history of the IRS whistleblower program). 
 17.  Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 § 406(a)(1)(D), Pub. L. No. 109-432, 120 
Stat. 2922 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b)); see Davis-Nozemack & Webber, supra note 
16, at 82–87 (describing the IRC enhancement that recognizes that a whistleblower may be 
culpable when blowing the whistle). 
 18.  26 U.S.C. § 7623(b)(3) (2006 & Supp. V 2012); see also Davis-Nozemack & 
Webber, supra note 16, at 86 (describing the IRC amendments as they pertain to complicit 
whistleblowers). 
 19.  S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 111 (2010). 
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knowledge of the UBS tax fraud.  This Section will also explore the ways 
in which the IRS whistleblower program strays from the structure upon 
which it was based:  the qui tam program of the False Claims Act, which 
rewards private citizens, even if complicit, for offering information 
regarding individuals who are defrauding the federal government, but 
excludes the criminally convicted from any award.20  This Section will 
suggest that the SEC’s approach represents a reasonable middle ground that 
reconciles the conflict between allowing wrongdoers to benefit from their 
own misconduct and incentivizing culpable insiders to come forward. 
Section IV will then draw parallels between the enforcement missions 
of the SEC and the IRS to refute arguments that the two agencies are so 
divergent as to justify their differing treatment of convicted whistleblowers.  
This Section will examine recent trends suggesting that the SEC has 
strongly emerged as a “punisher”, utilizing enforcement structures that are 
more akin to a criminal enforcement agency like the IRS.  In this way, the 
enforcement mechanisms of the two agencies may be more alike than 
presumed.  It is the author’s hope that this Article will invite further 
scholarly discussion on this topic, as legislative history of the applicable 
statutes and legal debate are lacking in this controversial area of 
whistleblower law. 
I. SEC AND IRS WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAMS 
A. Structure of the IRS Whistleblower Program 
The IRS has rewarded informants since the nineteenth century.  
Codified in present-day Section 7623 of the IRC, the IRS began rewarding 
persons providing information about tax noncompliance in 1867 under 
legislation that gave it “the authority ‘to pay . . . sums as . . . deem[ed] 
necessary for detecting and bringing to trial and punishment persons guilty 
of violating the internal revenue laws or conniving at the same.’”21  Until 
1996, the IRS made these payments from a pool of appropriated funds, but 
subsequent legislation was enacted that changed the source of rewards to 
the proceeds of amounts collected from the taxpayer.22  The 1996 
 
 20.  31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012 & Supp. I 2013). 
 21.  IRS WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE, FISCAL YEAR 2010 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE 
USE OF SECTION 7623 (2010), http://www.irs.gov/pub/whistleblower/annual_report_to_ 
congress_fy_2010.pdf [hereinafter 2010 REPORT]; Davis-Nozemack & Webber, supra note 
16, at 82; see also Brian H. Mahany, The IRS Whistleblower Program:  What CPAs Should 
Know, Tipsters, IRS Profit from 2006 Reforms, J. ACCOUNTANCY 50, 51 (2009) (noting that 
few changes were made to the IRS informant/whistleblower program between 1867 and 
1996). 
 22.  2010 REPORT, supra note 21, at 2. 
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amendments also included the detection of tax underpayments among the 
types of information that would qualify whistleblowers for a bounty.23  
During this time, awards for tax whistleblowers were only discretionary, 
allowing the IRS to grant awards to whistleblowers of one, ten, or fifteen 
percent of the proceeds with a cap at $10 million, which the IRS sometimes 
waived.24 
The IRS whistleblower program continued in this manner until June 
2006, when the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration 
(“TIGTA”) conducted an audit of the program upon the request of 
Congress.25  Although the TIGTA audit uncovered the broad success of the 
program, it also revealed weaknesses in the discretionary structure of the 
reward model, including under-utilization, administrative problems, and a 
lack of clarity as to the defined incentives of whistleblowers.26  The TIGTA 
report prompted new legislation to strengthen and enhance the IRS 
whistleblower program.27  Through amendments passed in 2006 as part of 
the Tax Relief and Healthcare Act, a new and improved IRS whistleblower 
program was born.  The ability of the IRS to grant discretionary awards 
was retained, though on a non-percentage basis, which is codified in 
present-day Section 7623(a) of the IRC.28 
The 2006 amendments also created the new Section 7623(b) of the 
IRC, which established a centralized IRS location, the Whistleblower 
Office, to receive and administer whistleblower tips and determine bounty 
 
 23.  Id.; Davis-Nozemack & Webber supra note 16, at 82.  Earlier versions of tax 
whistleblower rewards did not provide much of an incentive to report and were also 
underutilized by the IRS. 
 24.  2010 REPORT, supra note 21, at 2. 
 25.  See Davis-Nozemack & Webber, supra note 16, at 84–85. 
 26.  Id. (citing TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., THE INFORMANTS’ REWARD 
PROGRAM NEEDS MORE CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT (2006), 
http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2006reports/200630092fr.pdf).  In its audit 
report, TIGTA expressed that, in 32 percent of cases, it was unable to determine the 
justification for the reward percentage awarded to informants and, in 76 percent of rejected 
claims, it was unable to determine the reason the reviewer rejected these claims.  Id. 
 27.  Id. at 85 (“Senator Charles Grassley, the champion of the Whistleblower Program 
and author of the 2006 reforms, persuaded Congress to significantly overhaul the 
Whistleblower Program following the TIGTA report.”). 
 28.  26 U.S.C. § 7623(a).  Present-day Section 7623(a) of the IRC states:   
The Secretary [of the Treasury] . . . is authorized to pay such sums as he deems 
necessary for (1) detecting underpayments of tax, or (2) detecting and bringing 
to trial and punishment persons guilty of violating the internal revenue laws or 
conniving at the same, in cases where such expenses are not otherwise provided 
for by law.  Any amount payable under the preceding sentence shall be paid 
from the proceeds of amounts collected by reason of the information provided, 
and any amount so collected shall be available for such payments. 
Id. 
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awards.  Section 7623(b) implements a mandatory, rather than 
discretionary, bounty structure for tax whistleblowers of at least 15 percent 
but not more than 30 percent of the collected proceeds, including penalties, 
interest, and additional amounts that result from any administrative or 
judicial action that the IRS has taken based on the whistleblower’s 
information.29  To qualify for a bounty, the whistleblower’s information 
must relate to a business tax noncompliance matter “in which the tax, 
penalties, interest, additions to tax, and additional amounts in dispute 
exceed $2,000,000,” and, when the information relates to an individual 
taxpayer’s noncompliance, a bounty is only available if that individual’s 
gross income exceeds $200,000 for at least one of the applicable tax 
years.30 
The Whistleblower Office determines the appropriate amount of the 
award.  It grants a minimum of 15 percent or a maximum of 30 percent of 
the collected proceeds from the IRS action, based on “the extent to which 
the individual substantially contributed to such action.”31  The bounty 
award can be decreased to 10 percent of the collected proceeds if the 
Whistleblower Office determines that the whistleblower’s information is 
principally based on allegations disclosed in certain sources of public 
information, such as a governmental report, hearing, audit, investigation or 
news media coverage.32  A whistleblower can also appeal his or her award 
determination to the United States Tax Court.33 
The IRS whistleblower program makes bounties available to culpable 
whistleblowers complicit in the tax violations, with variations in reward 
amounts based on the individual’s level of involvement in the tax 
noncompliance.  As stated in the IRC: 
 
If the Whistleblower Office determines that the claim for an 
award . . . is brought by an individual who planned and initiated 
the actions that led to the underpayment of tax or actions . . . then 
the Whistleblower Office may appropriately reduce such award.  
 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  2010 REPORT, supra note 21, at 3; see also Davis-Nozemack & Webber, supra note 
16, at 85 (noting that Congress intended to use this program as a way to obtain maximum 
returns in relation to the cost of the program by targeting “high dollar tax abuses.”).  One 
other scholar notes that the high threshold for tax whistleblower awards is likely to defer 
most claims to the discretionary program of Section 7623(a).  Edward A. Morse, 
Whistleblowers and Tax Enforcement:  Using Inside Information to Close the “Tax Gap,” 
24 AKRON TAX J. 1, 18 (2009). 
 31.  Id. § 7623(b). 
 32.  Id. § 7623(b)(2)(A); see also 2010 REPORT, supra note 21, at 3. 
 33.  See id. § 7623(b)(4) (stipulating that appeals must be filed within 30 days of the 
award determination). 
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If such individual is convicted of criminal conduct arising from 
the role described in the preceding sentence, the Whistleblower 
Office shall deny any award.34 
 
Therefore, the IRS Whistleblower Office may decrease the amount of 
a bounty for culpable whistleblowers that planned and initiated the tax 
noncompliance action and may outright deny a bounty to tax 
whistleblowers convicted because of that particular leadership role.  In 
other words, the IRS still provides a bounty to a convicted criminal who 
participated in the tax violation but did not plan and initiate the 
wrongdoing.  As the IRS seems to have acknowledged, “promoters of tax 
shelters and tax fraud are not surrounded by boy scouts and angels,”35 and 
often have unclean hands.  After all, “[y]ou need someone whose hands are 
dirty to find dirt.”36  Information from those complicit in the violation 
unquestionably involves details that would otherwise be difficult to locate.  
The IRS Whistleblower Office receives information from individuals who 
discover tax noncompliance in any number of ways, including through the 
individual’s workplace or daily personal business.37  “Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the [IRS] often receives tips after a relationship has gone bad, 
be it a familial, romantic, or business relationship.  It is this type of intimate 
relationship that often provides for the ‘detailed inside knowledge that will 
be the most beneficial in bringing forward tax fraud.’”38 
Reporting incentives for those in possession of information otherwise 
difficult to obtain have proven successful.  In a June 2006 report, the U.S. 
Treasury expressed that investigations based on the IRS whistleblower 
program were more effective and efficient in detecting tax noncompliance 
 
 34.  Id. § 7623(b)(3) (emphasis added). 
 35.  Davis-Nozemack & Webber, supra note 16, at 81 (citing Letter from Jessica 
Radack, Dr. Marsha Coleman-Adebayo & Gina Green to Douglas Shulman, Comm’r, 
Internal Revenue Serv., 3 (Aug. 10, 2011), 
http://www.grassley.senate.gov/about/upload/PlannedandInitiated Letter.pdf [hereinafter 
Radack Letter]).  In this letter, Radack of the Government Accountability Project, Coleman-
Adebayo of the No FEAR Coalition, and Green of the National Whistleblowers Center 
wrote to the IRS Commissioner expressing their concern that the Internal Revenue Manual’s 
interpretation of “planned and initiated” for purposes of considering a reduced bounty 
“depart[s] significantly from the traditional understanding of the planned and initiated 
limitation for [other] whistleblower awards as reflected in Congressional intent, the caselaw 
and the clear language of the statute.”  Radack Letter, supra, at 1. 
 36.  Robert W. Wood, Even Tax Cheats Can Claim IRS Whistleblower Rewards, 
BLOOMBERG BNA TAX & ACCOUNTING CENTER, Nov. 16, 2012, http://www.bna.com/even-
tax-cheats-n17179870951. 
 37.  See Robert E. McKenzie, New Law Raises the Financial Incentive for Turning in 
Tax Cheats, 79 PRACTICAL TAX STRATEGIES 40, 41 (2007) (discussing the compensation of 
whistleblowers under federal law). 
 38.  Davis-Nozemack & Webber, supra note 16, at 82. 
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than the IRS’s primary method of selecting tax returns for further 
scrutiny.39  Statistics show that the revised IRS whistleblower program has 
indeed brought in more tips.  Within the first twelve months of the 
amended program, the IRS received 116 submissions alleging more than $2 
million in tax violations,40 and an aggregate of 1,578 submissions by the 
end of fiscal year 2013.41 
The SEC whistleblower program has been similarly successful since 
the Dodd-Frank amendments.  The SEC has noted that it receives dozens of 
useful, high-quality tips per week.42  The SEC has described fiscal year 
2014 as “historic,” awarding individuals more whistleblower awards than 
in all prior years combined, including the largest award to date:  $30 
million.43  The number of whistleblower tips that the SEC received in 2014 
increased by approximately 20 percent in the last two years to a total of 
3,620.44  The SEC noted that the recipients of whistleblower awards each 
provided valuable information that was specific, credible, and timely, 
identifying particular individuals involved in the fraud and specific 
documents or transactions substantiating the allegations that led to 
successful SEC enforcement actions.45 
B. Dodd-Frank Introduces a Bounty Model 
The current SEC whistleblower program was enacted in 2010 
 
 39.  McKenzie, supra note 37, at 42. 
 40.  See John Ashcroft, Catherine Hanaway & Claudia L. Oñate Greim, Whistleblowers 
Cash In, Unwary Corporations Pay, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 367, 378–79 (2011) (discussing 
the efficacy of the SEC’s whistleblower program); see also News Release IR-2007-201, 
Internal Revenue Service, Procedure Unveiled for Reporting Violations of the Tax Law, 
Making Reward Claims, (Dec. 19, 2007), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Procedure-Unveiled-for-
Reporting-Violations-of-the-Tax-Law,--Making-Reward-Claims (noting that since the 2006 
amendments, “informants have come forward with information on alleged tax 
noncompliance amounting to tens of millions of dollars, and in some cases hundreds of 
millions of dollars.”). 
 41.  See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FISCAL YEAR 2013 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON 
THE USE OF SECTION 7623 (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/whistleblower/ 
Whistleblower_Annual_report_FY_13_3_7_14_52549.pdf (discussing the policy 
ramifications of recently implemented whistleblower provisions). 
 42.  See Ben Protess & Nathaniel Popper, Hazy Future for Thriving S.E.C. Whistle-
Blower Effort, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2013, at B1, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/23/ 
hazy-future-for-s-e-c-s-whistle-blower-office/?_r=0 (noting the effectiveness of 
whistleblowers in enforcing SEC rules). 
 43.  See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT ON THE DODD-FRANK 
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM (2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/ 
offices/owb/annual-report-2014.pdf (discussing whistleblower tips and incentives in fiscal 
year 2014).  
 44.  Id. at 3. 
 45.  Id. at 16. 
PACELLA_FINAL (ARTICLE 1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/25/2015  7:19 PM 
356 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 17:2 
 
pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, a sweeping piece of legislation aimed at 
“promot[ing] the financial stability of the United States by improving 
accountability and transparency in the financial system . . . .”46  In addition 
to implementing a myriad of financial regulatory reforms, Dodd-Frank 
created a robust whistleblower program intended to promote the receipt of 
information pertaining to violations of securities laws.47  Section 922 of 
Dodd-Frank amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by including a 
new section 21F, “Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protection,”48 
which improves the whistleblower retaliation protections of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 and creates a new bounty program requiring the SEC to 
pay whistleblowers who provide “original information”49 regarding a 
violation of the federal securities laws.50  If the SEC is successful in an 
enforcement action based on this information, it:  
 
[S]hall pay an award or awards to 1 or more whistleblowers who 
voluntarily provided original information to the [SEC] that led to 
the successful enforcement of the covered . . . action, in an 
aggregate amount equal to (A) not less than 10 percent, in total, 
of what has been collected of the monetary sanctions imposed in 
the action or related actions; and (B) not more than 30 percent, in 
total, of what has been collected of the monetary sanctions 
imposed in the action or related actions.51 
 
The SEC determines the amount of the bounty in its discretion, taking into 
consideration the significance of the information and degree of assistance 
that the whistleblower has provided.52  Whistleblowers who are denied 
 
 46.  H.R. RES. 4173, 111th Cong. (2010) (enacted). 
 47.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012 & Supp. I 2013) (stipulating the incentives and 
protections afforded to whistleblowers). 
 48.  17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-1 (2014). 
 49.  Id. § 240.21F-4(b).  “Original” information is (i) derived from independent 
knowledge or independent analysis; (ii) not already known to the SEC from another source; 
(iii) not exclusively derived from an allegation made in a judicial or administrative hearing 
or governmental report or investigation; and (iv) provided to the SEC for the first time after 
July 21, 2010 (Dodd-Frank’s enactment).  Id. 
 50.  See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F-1, 240.21F-2 (stipulating compensation for 
whistleblowers); see also S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 110–11 (2010) (recommending the 
passage of the Dodd-Frank bill, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs noted that the new whistleblower program “aims to motivate those with inside 
knowledge to come forward and assist the Government to identify and prosecute persons 
who have violated securities laws and recover money for victims of financial fraud.”). 
 51.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b). 
 52.  See id. § 78u-6(c) (stipulating the terms of whistleblower awards). 
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bounties can appeal their denial in federal court.53 
The legislative history of Dodd-Frank reveals that the SEC 
whistleblower program was modeled after the 2006 amendments to the IRS 
whistleblower program.54  In a Senate Report examining Dodd-Frank, the 
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs recognized the 
invaluable contributions that whistleblower tips provide, citing statistics 
that such tips have “detected 54.1% of uncovered fraud schemes in public 
companies” while external auditors and SEC exam teams detected only 
4.1% of fraud schemes, making whistleblower tips “13 times more 
effective than external audits . . . .”55  The Committee also recognized that a 
whistleblower has a “difficult choice between telling the truth and the risk 
of committing ‘career suicide,’” thereby supporting the new bounty 
structure as an appropriate reward to incentivize whistleblowers.56  Noting 
that the SEC whistleblower program is modeled after the amended IRS 
program, the Committee expressed the opinion that “[t]he reformed IRS 
program, which, too, has a similar minimum-maximum award levels and an 
appeals process, is credited to have reinvigorated the earlier, largely 
ineffective, IRS Whistleblower Program.”57  The “critical component” of 
offering bounties to whistleblowers “is the minimum payout that any 
individual could look towards in determining whether to take the enormous 
risk of blowing the whistle in calling attention to fraud.”58 
Despite being based on the IRS model, the SEC whistleblower 
program differs significantly as to the availability of bounties for culpable 
whistleblowers convicted of criminal activity related to the underlying 
action for which they are reporting.  While the SEC will also reward a 
culpable whistleblower, it will not reward one who is convicted of the 
underlying crime.59  Section 78u-6(c)(2)(B) of Dodd-Frank states that “no 
award . . . shall be made . . . to any whistleblower who is convicted of a 
 
 53.  See id. § 78u-6(b)(2)(f) (discussing the appeals process for whistleblowers). 
 54.  See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 110–11 (discussing the development of the IRS 
whistleblower program).  
 55.  Id. at 110 (citing testimony for the Senate Banking Committee by Certified Fraud 
Examiner and Madoff whistleblower Harry Markopolos). 
 56.  Id. at 111. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  See Heidi L. Hansberry, Comment, In Spite of Its Good Intentions, the Dodd-Frank 
Act Has Created an FCPA Monster, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 195, 211 (2012) 
(recognizing that Dodd-Frank “draws a distinction between a cooperating informant who is 
convicted of a crime and a whistleblower.”); see also Richard F. Albert, Would $104 Million 
IRS Whistleblower Get Stiffed under Dodd-Frank?, FORBES (Sept. 19, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2012/09/19/would-104-million-irs-whistleblower-get-
stiffed-under-dodd-frank/ (noting that Bradley Birkenfeld would not have been granted an 
award if he provided information about corporate securities fraud instead of tax fraud). 
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criminal violation related to the judicial or administrative action for which 
the whistleblower otherwise could receive an award . . . .”60  Although not 
included on the face of the statute itself, a variation of the “planning and 
initiating” language of the IRC is codified in the final SEC rules that 
implement Dodd-Frank, but only with respect to how the $1 million 
threshold is determined.61  In determining whether the $1 million level has 
been met for the underlying action, which is a prerequisite of eligibility for 
a bounty, the SEC will not take into account any monetary sanctions that 
the whistleblower is required to pay due to also being at fault.62  In 
addition, the SEC will not take into account any monetary sanctions 
ordered against an entity for conduct that the whistleblower directed, 
planned, or initiated.63  The SEC has expressed that the purpose of this 
provision “is to prevent wrongdoers from benefitting by, in effect, blowing 
the whistle on themselves.”64  Therefore, the SEC uses a variation of the 
“planning and initiating” language found in the IRC not for the purpose of 
reducing the bounty, but to determine eligibility for the bounty itself.65 
The SEC whistleblower program and the qui tam program of the False 
Claims Act, which will be explored further in Section II of this Article, 
resemble each other in that both deny rewards to whistleblowers who are 
convicted of any criminal conduct in connection with the underlying action.  
The IRS takes a broader approach to eligibility by making rewards 
available for convicted criminals as long as they have not “planned and 
initiated” the misconduct.66  These nuances have a significant practical 
effect.  If Bradley Birkenfeld had blown the whistle on a violation of the 
securities laws rather than on tax evasion, he would not have been eligible 
for a bounty. 
 
 60.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(2)(B) (2012 & Supp. I 2013). 
 61.  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-16 (noting that whistleblowers who direct, plan, or initiate 
the conduct are limited in their awards). 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. (emphasis added).  This part of the rules also reads:  
Similarly, if the [SEC] determines that a whistleblower is eligible for an award, 
any amounts that the whistleblower or such an entity pay in sanctions as a result 
of the action or related actions will not be included within the calculation of the 
amounts collected for purposes of making payments.   
Id. 
 64.  Press Release No. 2011-116, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rules to 
Establish Whistleblower Program (May 25, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
press/2011/2011-116.htm. 
 65.  Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b) (2012 & Supp. I 2013) (discussing eligibility for 
and payment of awards) and 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (b) (2012 & Supp. I 2013) (stipulating 
actions by private persons) with 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b) (2012 & Supp. I 2013) (discussing 
awards for whistleblowers). 
 66.  26 U.S.C. § 7623(b)(3). 
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II. REWARDING CULPABLE WHISTLEBLOWERS 
A. Bradley Birkenfeld’s Bounty 
Bradley Birkenfeld was an American private banker at UBS’s 
headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland who was employed to advise United 
States taxpayers holding UBS accounts abroad.67  Birkenfeld, a 
Massachusetts native who studied banking at the American Graduate 
School of Business in Switzerland, worked five years for UBS in this 
capacity.68  Based in UBS’s Global Wealth Management International & 
Switzerland unit, Birkenfeld’s primary duty was to acquire and develop 
new U.S. clients, which he accomplished by traveling to the U.S. on a 
quarterly basis.69  Rather than conducting operations that were legal, 
Birkenfeld found himself in the midst of a major tax evasion scheme 
facilitated by UBS that helped U.S. taxpayers hide their assets in offshore 
accounts held by sham entities in Switzerland.70  UBS collaborated with 
U.S. taxpayers to prepare false IRS forms, giving the appearance that non-
U.S. taxpayers owned the accounts, thereby aiding 19,000 clients in 
avoiding tax liabilities of about $19 billion.71  UBS trained its bankers, 
including Birkenfeld, to falsely state on customs forms upon arrival in the 
U.S. that they were traveling for pleasure instead of business and to carry 
encrypted laptop computers holding the portfolios of clients to avoid 
detection.72  Aware of the illegal scheme, Birkenfeld participated in the tax 
fraud by recruiting U.S. clients in this manner, helping them hide their 
 
 67.  See John C. McDougal, The UBS “John Doe” Summons, in 2008 ALI-ABA 
COURSE OF STUDY:  INTERNATIONAL TRUST & ESTATE PLANNING  931, 962 (asserting that 
UBS is a bank headquartered in Switzerland which maintains branches throughout the 
United States, “provid[ing] a comprehensive range of products and services, individually 
tailored for wealthy and affluent clients around the world.”).  McDougal conducted an 
interview with Bradley Birkenfeld on October 12, 2007 regarding Birkenfeld’s practices as 
a U.S. tax advisor in Switzerland.  Id. 
 68.  See David Kocieniewski, Whistle-Blower Awarded $104 Million by I.R.S., N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 11, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/business/whistle-blower-
awarded-104-million-by-irs.html (describing Birkenfeld’s whistleblowing efforts). 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  See J. Richard Harvey, Jr., Offshore Accounts:  Insider’s Summary of FATCA and 
its Potential Future, 57 VILL. L. REV. 471, 476 (2012) (discussing the UBS scandal and 
Birkenfeld’s role). 
 71.  McDougal, supra note 67, at 962-65; see 60 Minutes:  Banking:  A Crack in the 
Swiss Vault (CBS television broadcast Dec. 30, 2009), available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/ news/banking-a-crack-in-the-swiss-vault [hereinafter 60 Minutes] 
(discussing the secretive world of Swiss banking). 
 72.  McDougal, supra note 67, at 963. 
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assets from the IRS, including sneaking diamonds into the U.S. in a 
toothpaste tube on one occasion.73 
In 2007, while still working at UBS, Birkenfeld began disclosing 
information about the scheme directly to the Department of Justice.74  He 
offered to wear a wire to record the conversations of high-level UBS 
executives in exchange for full immunity from criminal prosecution.75  To 
his dismay, Birkenfeld was denied immunity because he failed to disclose 
his relationship with his biggest client, Igor Olenicoff, a U.S. taxpayer and 
wealthy real estate developer for whom Birkenfeld helped hide $200 
million in offshore hidden accounts.76  In May 2008, U.S. authorities 
arrested Birkenfeld for conspiracy to commit tax fraud stemming from his 
involvement with Olenicoff.77  Birkenfeld pleaded guilty to these charges 
on June 19, 2008.  After Birkenfeld was denied immunity, a lighter 
sentence, and postponement of prison,78 he was sentenced to forty months 
in prison for his involvement in the tax evasion scheme.79 
Birkenfeld’s information as a whistleblower proved monumentally 
important in uncovering the specific details that led to an investigation of 
UBS by the Department of Justice.  This information allowed the U.S. to 
penetrate Swiss banking secrecy laws and recover billions of dollars in 
 
 73.  See Laura Saunders & Robin Sidel, Whistleblower Gets $104 Million, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 11, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390444017504577645 
412614237708 (discussing Birkenfeld’s whistleblower award). 
 74.  Harvey, supra note 70, at 476. 
 75.  60 Minutes, supra note 71. 
 76.  Id.; see Harvey, supra note 70, at 476. 
 77.  McDougal, supra note 67, at 962, 964-65.  Birkenfeld later revealed that Olenicoff 
formed a Bahamian corporation with the assistance of UBS and completed a fraudulent IRS 
form that made it appear as if the corporation was actually the beneficial owner of his 
offshore UBS account.  Id. at 963-64.  Olenicoff then transferred $60 million and a 147-foot 
yacht to the fake corporation and other sham entities, allowing him to “refrain from 
reporting the income secure in the knowledge that UBS would maintain the traditional 
secrecy of Swiss accounts.” Id. at 965.  Olenicoff pleaded guilty to filing false tax returns in 
December of 2007.  Id.; see Spencer Daly, Secrecy in Limbo:  What the Most Recent 
Settlement with the IRS Means for UBS and the Rest of the Swiss Banking Industry, 10 J. 
INT’L. BUS. & L. 133, 146 (2011) (discussing Olenicoff’s fraudulent activity). 
 78.  See Press Release, Saul Ewing LLP, IRS Whistleblower Claims Increase After 
Whistleblower Convicted in Tax Scheme Receives Record-Setting $104 Million Award 
(Nov. 1 2012), http://www.saul.com/publications-alerts-963.html (“[P]rosecutors opted to 
charge [Birkenfeld] with conspiracy to evade taxes due to his failure to fully disclose his 
own involvement in the fraud.”); see also Bruce Zagaris, IRS Pays Felon Birkenfeld $104 
Million as Whistleblower for UBS Case, 28 INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 391 (2012) 
(discussing Birkenfeld’s whistleblower award). 
 79.  See Curt Anderson, Bradley Birkenfeld:  UBS Informant to Begin Prison Sentence 
Friday, Huffington Post, Mar. 18, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/01/04/ 
bradley-birkenfeld-ubs-in_n_410753.html (discussing Birkenfeld’s prison sentence). 
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unpaid taxes.80  Birkenfeld assisted the United States by providing internal 
UBS documents and information pertaining to the countless transactions 
with U.S. clients that were deeply concealed in Swiss vaults.81  
Birkenfeld’s information allowed the Department of Justice to garner 
enough evidence to file a petition in federal court in June 2008 requesting 
leave to file an IRS “‘John Doe’ summons.”82  This summons would 
require UBS to disclose the names of all of its U.S. clients who opened 
bank accounts in Switzerland that were undisclosed to the IRS––an 
endeavor “represent[ing] the first time that the United States ha[d] 
attempted to pierce Swiss bank secrecy by compelling a Swiss bank to 
name its U.S. clients.”83  When UBS objected to the summons, citing Swiss 
bank secrecy law, the Swiss government intervened by filing an amicus 
brief arguing that the United States could obtain account-holder 
information only through a request under the 1996 U.S.-Swiss tax treaty.84  
In August 2009, the U.S. government withdrew the John Doe summons, 
agreed with Switzerland to treat the request as occurring under the treaty, 
and signed a protocol amending the treaty.85  In February 2009, UBS 
signed a deferred prosecution agreement with the Department of Justice 
pursuant to which it was required to “provide the U.S. government with the 
names of 200 to 300 U.S. clients of [its] cross-border business, exit the 
business of providing banking services to U.S. clients with undeclared 
accounts, and pay a total of $780 million in fines and penalties.”86 
Shortly thereafter, the IRS launched a voluntary disclosure initiative 
for offshore tax evasion, which required participating taxpayers to pay 
taxes and interest due on Swiss accounts for the previous six years and 
disclose information about their foreign accounts.87  This initiative, 
launched in 2009 and otherwise known as the Offshore Voluntary 
Disclosure Initiative or “OVDI”, was a variant of a longstanding initiative 
that the IRS already had in place to promote voluntary tax disclosures, but 
introduced more formal procedures and rules.88  The OVDI proved 
instrumental in prompting taxpayers to come forward and was: 
 
 80.  60 Minutes, supra note 71. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Symposium, The Use of Voluntary Disclosure Initiatives in the Battle Against 
Offshore Tax Evasion, 57 VILL. L. REV. 499, 509 (2012). 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id.  
 86.  Laura Szarmach, Note, Piercing the Veil of Bank Secrecy? Assessing the United 
States’ Settlement in UBS Case, 43 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 409, 411 (2010) (citing Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement, Exhibit C at 3–4, United States v. UBS AG, No. 09-60033 (S.D. 
Fla. Feb. 19, 2009)). 
 87. The Use of Voluntary Disclosure Initiatives, supra note 82, at 510. 
 88.  See Paul Marcotte, IRS Winning Game of Offshore Hide and Seek, 46 MD. B.J. 4, 7 
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[T]imed to profit from the publicity about Birkenfeld and UBS:  
‘Following the announcement in May 2008 that the Justice 
Department had indicted former UBS banker Bradley Birkenfeld, 
the IRS voluntary disclosure program saw a dramatic rise in 
taxpayers coming forward to turn over information on previously 
undisclosed Swiss bank accounts.’  The 2009 initiative brought in 
about 15,000 disclosures––many times more than the 
approximately 1,000 that the IRS reportedly expected.  In early 
2012, the IRS reported that it had “collected $3.4 billion so far 
from people who participated in the 2009 offshore program, 
reflecting closures of about 95 percent of the cases from the 2009 
program.”89 
 
Birkenfeld has been described “as the single most important informant 
in the U.S. probe of tax evasion and secrecy at UBS and other banks” and 
“‘the goose that laid the golden eggs,’”90 whose information “led to an 
investigation that has greatly diminished Switzerland’s status as a secret 
haven for American tax cheats and allowed the Treasury to recover billions 
in unpaid taxes.”91 
When Birkenfeld finished his prison term, the IRS awarded him what 
is believed to be “the largest-ever whistleblower payout to an individual.”92  
On September 11, 2012, the IRS awarded Birkenfeld a bounty of $104 
million pursuant to the IRS whistleblower program.93  Birkenfeld was not 
disqualified from receiving the reward under the IRC because he was not 
 
(2013) (discussing traditional internal voluntary disclosure practice and the transition to the 
more formalized practices under OVDI). 
 89.  The Use of Voluntary Disclosure Initiatives, supra note 82, at 510 (citing David D. 
Stewart, IRS Voluntary Disclosure Program Gets High Marks from Practitioners, So Far, 
TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 3, 2009, at 169-18; Shulman Addresses IRS’s Strategic Priorities 
for the Future, TAX NOTES TODAY, May 19, 2011, at 97-11; I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-5, 
Internal Revenue Serv., IRS Offshore Programs Produce $4.4 Billion to Date for Nation’s 
Taxpayers; Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program Reopen (Jan. 9, 2012), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-12-005.pdf). 
 90.  Andersen, supra note 79 (referencing comments of Birkenfeld’s attorneys from the 
National Whistleblowers Center). 
 91.  Kocieniewski, supra note 68; see Harvey, supra note 70, at 478 (noting that the 
Department of Justice began pursuing UBS on the basis of Birkenfeld’s information); 
Bradley J. Bonti, Don’t Tread on Me:  Has the United States Government’s Quest for 
Customer Records from UBS Sounded the Death Knell for Swiss Bank Secrecy Laws? 30 
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 7–8 (2010) (“Information provided by Birkenfeld pointed 
prosecutors directly to UBS’s banking operations in Switzerland.”). 
 92.  Saunders & Sidel, supra note 73. 
 93.  Id.; see Saul Ewing LLP, supra note 78 (discussing Birkenfeld’s $104 million 
award for assisting the IRS). 
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the “planne[r] and initiat[or]” of the fraud.94  Without offering insight as to 
how it made its determination, the IRS found that Birkenfeld’s conduct did 
not amount to “planning and initiating,” which caused one source to 
comment that “‘[i]f Bradley Birkenfeld is award-eligible, your average tax 
director will have no problem overcoming the planned-and-initiated 
hurdle . . . .’”95  The IRS considered Birkenfeld to have been a low-level 
employee, “intimating that those higher up planned or initiated the 
scheme.”96  Although Birkenfeld was deemed not to be a planner or 
initiator of the tax fraud scheme, he was clearly not innocent.  Aware of the 
illegality of UBS’s direction, Birkenfeld proceeded to assist U.S. taxpayers 
in hiding their assets, including concealment of $200 million of Igor 
Olenicoff’s assets, his largest client.97 
Significant public attention resulted from Birkenfeld’s receipt of a 
$104 million bounty,98 creating concerns among many that depicting “a 
criminal-turned-whistleblower” as a hero could negatively affect the 
public’s perception of the role that whistleblowers play in society.99  One 
commentator described Birkenfeld’s bounty as “‘sordidness piled on 
sordidness,’”100 responding to Birkenfeld’s statement of “I’m the most 
famous whistleblower in the history of the world.  It’s a question of doing 
the right thing, and that’s what I did” with “[w]hat would have been right 
was not participating in tax evasion in the first place.”101 
 
 94.  Pat Dulnier, UBS Whistleblower May Be Ineligible to Receive Reward Because of 
Dodd-Frank, BANK CREDIT NEWS (Sept. 20, 2012), http://bankcreditnews.com/news/ubs-
whistleblower-may-be-ineligible-to-receive-reward-because-of-dodd-frank/5362. 
 95.  Jeremiah Coder, IRS Pays Birkenfeld $104 Million Whistleblower Award, TAX 
NOTES TODAY (Sept. 1, 2012), http://www.tax-whistleblower.com/articles/IRS-Pays-
Birkenfeld-104-Million-Whistleblower-Award.pdf (citing Gregory S. Lyman of the Ferrero 
Law Firm); see Jack Townsend, Birkenfeld Gets $104 Million Whistleblower Award, FED. 
TAX CRIMES BLOG (Sept. 11, 2012, 1:22 PM), http://federaltaxcrimes.blogspot.com/ 
2012/09/birkenfeld-gets-104-million.html (claiming that the award to Birkenfeld indicated 
the IRS’s willingness to use information that violates foreign (Swiss) law in order to collect 
revenue). 
 96.  Coder, supra note 95 (citing Barbara T. Kaplan of Greenberg Traurig LLP). 
 97.  Ken Stier, Why Is the UBS Whistleblower Headed to Prison?, TIME (Oct. 6, 2009), 
http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1928897,00.html.  
 98.  See Orly Lobel, Linking Prevention, Detection, and Whistleblowing:  Principles for 
Designing Effective Reporting Systems, 54 S. TEX. L. REV. 37, 38 (2012) (noting that the 
$104 million reward received substantial attention because of the size and surrounding 
circumstances). 
 99.  Id. at 39. 
 100.  Id. (quoting Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Bradley Birkenfeld, Hero of Tax Reform, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 15–16, 2012, at A13, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10000872396390444023704577651231299649806). 
 101.  Jenkins, supra note 100. 
PACELLA_FINAL (ARTICLE 1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/25/2015  7:19 PM 
364 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 17:2 
 
B. Should the Law Allow Culpable Whistleblowers to Be Rewarded? 
The story of Bradley Birkenfeld demonstrates the controversy 
surrounding the practice of allowing culpable whistleblowers to receive 
bounties, which is exacerbated in instances involving criminally-convicted 
whistleblowers.  “Depending on your point of view, [Birkenfeld] is either a 
felon who was complicit in the crime he reported and does not deserve his 
reward or he is a new type of whistle-blower—one with knowledge of a 
complicated crime that came from being a part of it.”102  The SEC has 
recognized that “sometimes we need people with dirty hands to point us in 
the right direction.  It is not necessarily a good feeling for everyone, but 
sometimes it is necessary.”103 
As a basic premise, rewarding whistleblowers with unclean hands 
provides value to the government, as was recognized by Congress when it 
enacted the qui tam program and subsequently the IRS and SEC 
whistleblower programs.  The qui tam program of the False Claims Act 
(“FCA”), the statute upon which the 2006 IRC amendments were 
modeled,104 was the first to establish a bounty system and is often referred 
to as the “‘gold standard’ of whistleblower protection and bounty 
rewards.”105  Under the FCA, private citizens, known as relators, may bring 
a “qui tam”106 civil action on behalf of the United States against individuals 
who defraud the federal government by committing acts such as submitting 
 
 102.  Paul Sullivan, The Price Whistle-Blowers Pay for Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 
2012, at B5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/22/your-money/for-whistle-
blowers-consider-the-risks-wealth-matters.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 103.  Joe Mont, SEC’s Whistleblower Bounties Will Be Awarded Subjectively, 
COMPLIANCE WEEK (June 6, 2012), http://www.complianceweek.com/secs-whistleblower-
bounties-will-be-awarded-subjectively/article/244605/ (citing the SEC); see Robert Howse 
& Ronald J. Daniels, Rewarding Whistleblowers: The Costs and Benefits of an Incentive-
Based Compliance Strategy, in CORPORATE DECISION-MAKING IN CANADA 525, 538 (Ronald 
J. Daniels & Randall Morck eds., 1995) (noting that “[a] special difficulty is apparent when 
a whistleblower is involved in the wrongdoing she has reported, either through complicity or 
through active initiative.”). 
 104.  Radack Letter, supra note 35, at 1; Michelle M. Kwon, Whistling Dixie About the 
IRS Whistleblower Program Thanks to the IRC Confidentiality Restrictions, 29 VA. TAX 
REV. 447, 457 (2010); Feldman & Lobel, supra note 1, at 1168. 
 105.  Rapp, supra note 6, at 76 (noting that although one scholar has described the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act as the gold standard of whistleblower protection, most research would 
support the FCA as such). 
 106.  “Qui tam” is a Latin term that is short for a phrase that translates into “‘who as well 
for the king as for himself sues in this matter.’”  Heather Elliott, Congress’s Inability to 
Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L. REV. 159, 196 n.219 (2011); see generally Patrick A. 
Barthle II, Note, Whistling Rogues:  A Comparative Analysis of the Dodd-Frank 
Whistleblower Bounty Program, 69 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1201, 1217 (2012) (noting that 
qui tam provisions were popular in England at the time the United States was founded). 
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false claims for payment to the federal government, knowingly using false 
statements to decrease an obligation to pay money to the government, or 
inducing the payment of a false claim.107  The qui tam plaintiff brings the 
action in the name of the U.S. Government by filing a complaint in federal 
district court, at which point the federal government has sixty days to 
intervene in the lawsuit; if the government declines to intervene, the qui 
tam plaintiff may proceed with the lawsuit.108  The Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) oversees these lawsuits as the actual entity that intervenes in the 
qui tam action, providing a “gatekeeper” role in which the DOJ may 
control the prosecution or dismiss it entirely.109  The FCA, which one 
scholar has described as “the lodestar of private enforcement of public 
law,”110 makes bounties available to a qui tam plaintiff.  If the government 
proceeds with the action, the qui tam plaintiff may receive fifteen to 
twenty-five percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement of the claim, 
depending upon the extent to which the person substantially contributed to 
the prosecution of the action, or between twenty-five to thirty percent if the 
government does not proceed with the action.111 
The FCA originated during the Civil War when Congress was 
receiving reports of misappropriation of money spent to assist the war 
effort by government suppliers that: 
 
‘accepted almost every offer and paid almost any price for [war] 
commodities, regardless of character, quality or quantity . . . . For 
sugar [the government] often got sand; for coffee, rye; for leather, 
something no better than brown paper; for sound horses and 
mules, spavined beasts and dying donkeys . . . .’112   
 
 107.  31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012 & Supp. I 2013); Kwon, supra note 104, at 457; Dennis 
J. Ventry, Jr., Whistleblowers and Qui Tam for Tax, 61 TAX LAW. 357, 368 (2008). 
 108.  Kwon, supra note 104, at 458 (“If the government intervenes [in the qui tam 
action], it has primary responsibility for prosecuting the action, but the qui tam plaintiff has 
the right to continue to be a party.” (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c))). 
 109.  David Freeman Engstrom, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement:  Empirical 
Analysis of DOJ Oversight of Qui Tam Litigation under the False Claims Act, 107 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1690, 1710–12 (2013).  As Engstrom’s research reveals, DOJ decision-making in qui 
tam litigation is controversial, as it is often guided by strategic and non-merit-based factors, 
prompting the need for an examination of judicial deference to such decisions.  Id. at 1749–
50. 
 110.  Ventry, supra note 107, at 368. 
 111.  § 3730(d)(1); see id. (noting that there is no absolute dollar cap on the amount of 
the bounty that the qui tam plaintiff can receive and reasonable expenses are also 
reimbursable); see also Joel D. Hesch, The False Claims Act Creates a “Zone of 
Protection” that Bars Suits Against Employees Who Report Fraud Against the Government, 
62 DRAKE L. REV. 361 (2014) (discussing the key False Claims Act provisions that promote 
federal interests in recruiting and protecting qui tam whistleblowers). 
 112.  Michael Neal, Securities Whistleblowing under Dodd-Frank:  Neglecting the 
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This misappropriation prompted the introduction of the FCA bill in 1863 to 
prevent and punish frauds committed against the U.S. government.113  The 
FCA is premised on the theory that it takes “a rogue to catch a rogue.”114  
The notion that complicit informants should be granted rewards for their 
information is rooted in motivating co-conspirators to provide information 
about each other.115  “The overriding theme of the [FCA] is virtually to 
deputize an army of insiders to uncover, inform, and pursue those 
government contractors who knowingly cheat in their agreements with the 
government.”116  The receipt of information from people on the inside is 
tremendously valuable, as wrongdoing often “takes place in the shadows 
[and] may never be visible to anyone but the immediate actors.”117  The 
idea behind this theory, “based on experience as old as modern 
civilization,” is that one of the most effective ways to detect fraud is to 
make its perpetrators liable to the action of a private person (the relator) 
acting “under the strong stimulus of personal ill will or the hope of gain.”118 
In enacting the FCA, Congress recognized the difficulties inherent in 
obtaining information from insiders or participants, who commonly feel 
that they have little to gain from reporting on fraudulent behavior and 
would more likely do so if financially rewarded.119  The primary goal of the 
 
Power of “Enterprising Privateers” in Favor of the “Slow-Going Public Vessel,” 15 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 1107, 1110 (2011) (citing CLAIRE M. SYLVIA, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT:  
FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENt § 2:6, at 42–43 (2010) (quoting 1 FRED ALBERT 
SHANNON, THE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNION ARMY 1861–1865, at 
55–56, 58 (1928))). 
 113.  James B. Helmer, Jr., False Claims Act:  Incentivizing Integrity for 150 Years for 
Rogues, Privateers, Parasites, and Patriots, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1261, 1265 (2013) (citing 
CONG. GLOBE, 37TH CONG., 3D SESS. 955, at 348 (1863) (statement of Senator Henry 
Wilson)). 
 114.  Id. at 1266 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 37TH CONG., 3D SESS. 955, at 348 (1863) 
(statement of Senator Jacob M. Howard)).  Senator Howard stated the following:   
[t]he bill offers, in short, a reward to the informer who comes into court and 
betrays his co-conspirator, if he be such . . . . I have based the fourth, fifth, sixth, 
and seventh sections upon the old-fashioned idea of holding out a temptation, 
and ‘setting a rogue to catch a rogue,’ which is the safest and most expeditious 
way I have ever discovered of bringing rogues to justice.   
Id. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. at 1262. 
 117.  Daniel K. Tarullo, The Limits of Institutional Design:  Implementing the OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 665, 689 (2004). 
 118.  Paul E. McGreal & DeeDee Baba, Applying Coase to Qui Tam Actions Against the 
States, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 87, 123 (2001) (quoting United States v. Griswold, 24 F. 
361, 366 (D. Or. 1885)). 
 119.  J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam 
Legislation, 86 N.C. L. REV. 539, 563 (2000). 
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FCA is the receipt of valuable information, which is incentivized regardless 
of whether the whistleblower was personally involved in the 
wrongdoing.120  As Terry Dworkin and Elletta Callahan explain, “the FCA 
rewards a ‘source’ who comes forward with useful information, no matter 
whether his or her decision to report was based on greed, a risk/benefit 
analysis, conscience, or something else.”121 
The policy rationale behind bounty rewards––even to those who are 
complicit––is to provide benefits to the whistleblower that outweigh the 
various costs of reporting information.122  Whistleblower scholars have 
widely noted the significant difficulties that whistleblowers face in 
deciding whether to come forward.  Richard Moberly has expressed that 
“almost all the benefits of whistleblower disclosures go to people other 
than the whistleblower, while most of the costs fall on the individual 
whistleblower.”123  Geoffrey Rapp has noted that “[s]omeone with 
information about fraud, absent bounties, faces a set of values––related or 
ethical pressures to blow the whistle, a set of values––related or ethical 
pressures to remain silent, as well as a set of economic or pecuniary 
pressures to remain silent.”124  When whistleblowers are themselves 
complicit, their incentives to report are likely to be even lower.  In such 
cases, the cost-benefit scale of reporting is likely to be heavily tipped 
towards the cost end of the scale.125  Therefore, it may be argued that 
bounties become even more important in these circumstances. 
 
 120.  Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Employee Disclosures to the 
Media:  When Is a “Source” a “Sourcerer”?, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 357, 368–69 
(1993). 
 121.  Id. (noting that even a party who planned and initiated the wrongdoing can recover 
under the FCA as long as such person is not convicted of a crime arising therefrom). 
 122.  See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, States of Pay:  Emerging Trends in State 
Whistleblower Bounty Schemes, 54 S. TEX. L. REV. 53, 59 (2012) (discussing the role of 
rewards in overcoming the concerns that cause potential whistleblowers to remain silent); 
see also Ashlin Aldinger, Comment, A Race to the IRS:  Are Snitches and Criminals the 
New Business Model? 51 HOUS. L. REV. 913, 931 (2014) (discussing what motivates 
whistleblowers to come forward and the potential moral issues with offering bounties to 
incentivize individuals to report tax noncompliance). 
 123.  Richard Moberly, Protecting Whistleblowers by Contract, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 
975, 980 (2008).  He further posited that: 
[s]ociety as a whole benefits from increased safety, better health, and more 
efficient law enforcement; shareholders benefit from increased transparency of 
corporate finances; and employees as a group benefit from improved working 
conditions.  Whistleblowers, on the other hand, face significant retaliation, from 
isolation at work, to discharge, to physical violence.   
Id. at 980–81. 
 124.  Rapp, supra note 122, at 59. 
 125.  See Beck, supra note 119, at 563 (explaining that inside information about 
wrongdoing is difficult to obtain because a person who participates in misconduct may have 
very little to gain and much to lose from exposing the fraudulent behavior). 
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As discussed, the legacy of the FCA creates an “innate conflict of 
using a ‘rogue’ to catch a rogue . . . .  [Whistleblower bounty] programs use 
informants they perhaps should not trust to catch cheats they do not trust.  
And therein lies the conflict.”126  However, “[w]histleblowers, culpable or 
not, are typically the only individuals who can (and often do) expose 
wrongdoing.  Without whistleblowers, the scandals they report on may 
never be known.”127  At the same time, there are concerns that providing 
bounties to culpable whistleblowers will actually encourage misconduct 
and may create an incentive to involve other employees in the 
wrongdoing.128 
The comments that the SEC received as part of its rulemaking process 
to implement the whistleblower section of Dodd-Frank provide a good 
example of the spectrum of perspectives pertaining to the issue of 
rewarding culpable whistleblowers.  Public policy considerations and the 
proper balance between rewarding culpable whistleblowers for their 
information and avoiding their reporting merely for bounty purposes must 
be thoroughly considered in implementing any bounty structure.  The SEC 
received over 240 comment letters and approximately 1,300 form letters 
from individuals, whistleblower advocacy groups, companies, law firms, 
and academics critiquing and supporting certain aspects of the proposed 
rules implementing Dodd-Frank,129 including the issue of whether awards 
should be available to culpable whistleblowers.130 
Several commentators recommended that the definition of 
“whistleblower” be limited to cover only those individuals who did not 
participate at all in the violations,131 thus excluding anyone with unclean 
hands.  Others commented that culpable whistleblowers should still receive 
awards but on a reduced level as not to create incentives for individuals to 
engage in wrongdoing.132  Many commentators were opposed to rules that 
 
 126.  Barthle, supra note 106, at 1202. 
 127.  Dylan Blaylock, ‘Culpable’ Whistleblowers Deserve Leniency, GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT (July 8, 2011), http://gaproject.nonprofitsoapbox.com/blog/ 
31/1252. 
 128.  Howse & Daniels, supra note 103, at 538. 
 129.  Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,300–
01 (June 13, 2011) [hereinafter Final SEC Rules]. 
 130.  Id. at 34,300.  Commentators also expressed views on the proposed exclusions 
from award eligibility for certain individuals, the procedures for making a claim for a 
bounty, and the application of the anti-retaliation provision.  Id. 
 131.  Id. at 34,302 (citing comment letters from Americans for Limited Gov’t; Ryder 
Sys., Inc.; Fin. Serv. Inst., Inc.; U.S. Chamber of Commerce; Verizon; and White & Case 
LLP). 
 132.  Id. at 34,330 (citing comment letters from Connolly & Finkel, Target, SIFMA, 
Bus. Roundtable, Washington Legal Found., Morgan Lewis, Fin. Serv. Roundtable, Soc’y 
of Corporate Sec’ys, Wells Fargo, Trace, Alcoa Grp., Oppenheimer Funds, Ass’n of 
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would exclude culpable whistleblowers completely from eligibility, 
arguing that insiders possess crucial knowledge and information about 
fraud and will be dissuaded from coming forward without the incentive that 
a bounty offers.133  The Auditing Standards Committee of the American 
Accounting Association was opposed to the SEC’s inquiry as to whether it 
should define “whistleblower” as an individual who provides information 
about potential securities law violations “by another person” so as to avoid 
rewarding whistleblowers for their own misconduct.134  The Auditing 
Standards Committee argued that limiting the definition of “whistleblower” 
as such may restrict those who are “tangentially involved” from making a 
report, which may include instances in which people believe they have 
participated in wrongdoing because they did not immediately report their 
observance of it or those who cooperate with wrongdoers under duress or 
coercion.135  Attorneys with experience representing whistleblowers 
bringing qui tam actions under the False Claims Act echoed these 
sentiments, arguing that defining whistleblowers as such may bar them 
from reporting even if they had a low level of participation in the 
wrongdoing.136  Because insiders have “a first-hand view of the fraud, they 
are frequently the best sources of information in enforcement actions 
against companies and upper level management.”137 
In contrast, some commentators––including the Securities Industry 
and Financial Markets Association, an organization representing securities 
firms, banks, and asset managers, Business Roundtable, an association of 
chief executive officers of major corporations, and OppenheimerFunds, 
Inc., a registered investment advisor––were in favor of defining a 
“whistleblower” as an individual who reports on violations committed by 
“another person.”138  These organizations argued that allowing individuals 
 
Corporate Counsel, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Center for Capital Mkts. 
Competitiveness); see Hansberry, supra note 59 (arguing that Dodd-Frank over-incentivizes 
whistleblowers by providing rewards to culpable whistleblowers who may not be 
convicted). 
 133.  Id. at 34,330–31 (citing comment letters from Auditing Standards Comm. of the 
Auditing Section of the Am. Accounting Ass’n, George Merkl and the Nat’l Whistleblower 
Ctr.). 
 134.  Auditing Standards Comm. of Am. Accounting Ass’n, Comment Letter on File No. 
S7-33-10, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Dec. 17, 2010, available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
comments/s7-33-10/s73310-149.pdf. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Wu, Grohovsky & Whipple; Vogel, Slade & Goldstein; and Kenney & McCafferty, 
Comment Letter on File No. S7-33-10, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Dec. 16, 2010, at 6, 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-136.pdf. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  SIFMA, Comment Letter on File No. S7-33-10, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 16, 
2010), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-161.pdf; OppenheimerFunds, 
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to profit while they also took part in the violations incentivizes misconduct 
and is contrary to the intent of Congress to reduce the overall number of 
violations of the law.139 
In an effort to adhere to the language of the statute as enacted by 
Congress, the SEC included in its final rules the culpability of 
whistleblowers (who are not convicted) as a factor that may decrease a 
whistleblower’s award percentage.140  For example, the SEC may decrease 
an award if the whistleblower played a significant role in the wrongdoing, 
acted with scienter, financially benefited from the violation, is a recidivist, 
or knowingly interfered with the SEC’s investigation of the violation.141  
The SEC will also consider the egregiousness of the underlying fraud 
committed by the whistleblower.142 
In a separate section of the rules pertaining to awards for 
whistleblowers who engage in culpable conduct, the SEC emphasized that 
it would not include “any monetary sanctions that the whistleblower is 
ordered to pay, or that an entity is ordered to pay if the entity’s liability is 
based substantially on conduct that the whistleblower directed, planned, or 
initiated” in the required $1,000,000 threshold for an award.143  In adopting 
the final rules, the SEC noted that public comment largely opposed an 
outright exclusion of culpable whistleblowers because the information they 
provide is too valuable.144  Those in favor of awarding culpable 
whistleblowers also believed that bounties may actually deter future 
conduct because those who violate securities law would be aware of the 
possibility that a co-conspirator might turn against them and report the 
wrongdoing in search of a bounty.145 
In adopting final rule 21F-16, the SEC stated: 
 
[W]e do not believe that a per se exclusion for culpable 
whistleblowers is consistent with Section 21F of the Exchange 
Act . . . the original Federal whistleblower statute—the False 
Claims Act—was premised on the notion that one effective way 
to bring about justice is to use a rogue to catch a rogue.  This 
 
Comment Letter on File No. S7-33-10, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 17, 2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-195.pdf. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Final SEC Rules, supra note 129, at 34,300, 34,331; 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(b)(1) 
(2014). 
 141.  Id. at 34,331; 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(b)(1) (2014). 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. at 34,349; 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-16 (2014). 
 144.  Id. at 34,349–50. 
 145.  Id. (“[S]ecurities violators would know that they forever face an increased risk that 
one of their co-conspirators ‘might turn state’s evidence against them.’” (citation omitted)). 
PACELLA_FINAL (ARTICLE 1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/25/2015  7:19 PM 
2015] BOUNTIES FOR BAD BEHAVIOR  371 
 
basic law enforcement principle is especially true for 
sophisticated securities fraud schemes which can be difficult for 
law enforcement authorities to detect and prosecute without 
insider information and assistance from participants in the 
scheme or their coconspirators.146   
 
At the same time, the SEC was sensitive to the fact that a failure to limit 
culpable whistleblowers’ eligibility for awards could prompt public policy 
concerns.147  The SEC created a reasonable middle ground to this conflict 
by enacting final rules that incentivize less culpable individuals to come 
forward while limiting awards based on the culpable whistleblower’s 
specific level of involvement. 
The outright ban on rewarding whistleblowers convicted of criminal 
activity in the action for which they are reporting was never altered from 
Dodd-Frank’s language as enacted by Congress during the SEC rulemaking 
process, and, in fact, was never discussed in the public comments.148  The 
legislative history of Dodd-Frank similarly lacks analysis as to the rationale 
behind denying convicts a bounty.  Although impossible to pinpoint, this 
void may be best explained by the view that such a concept—allowing a 
convicted criminal to obtain a bounty—is morally reprehensible to many. 
III. CRITIQUE OF THE IRS MODEL 
A. Immunity and Leniency 
The law has long recognized the “fundamental equitable principle” 
that criminals, who have either admitted to guilt during a plea bargain 
process or have been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt after trial, 
should not financially benefit from their actions.149  Case law stemming 
 
 146.  Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted) (noting that “[i]nsiders regularly 
provide law enforcement authorities with early and invaluable assistance in identifying the 
scope, participants, victims, and ill-gotten gains from these fraudulent schemes.  
Accordingly, culpable whistleblowers can enhance the [SEC]’s ability to detect violations of 
the Federal securities laws, increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the [SEC]’s 
investigations, and provide important evidence for the [SEC]’s enforcement actions.”). 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  See Final SEC Rules, supra note 129 (providing no explanation as to why 
convicted whistleblowers are denied a bounty). 
 149.  Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 
105, 119 (1991) (citing Children of Bedford v. Petromelis, 573 N.E.2d 541, 548 (N.Y. 
1991)).  In contexts beyond whistleblowing, these principles have prompted the enactment 
of laws like the “Son of Sam laws,” which prevent criminals from earning a profit from the 
commercial sale of their crime stories.  See Sarah N. Conde, Capote in the Jury Box: 
Analyzing the Ethics of Jurors Writing Books, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 643, 655 (2006)  
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from the nineteenth century highlights the public policy concerns 
associated with allowing wrongdoers to profit from their misdeeds:   
 
No one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take 
advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own 
iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime.  These maxims 
are dictated by public policy, have their foundation in universal 
law administered in all civilized countries, and have nowhere 
been superseded by statutes.150   
 
The IRS whistleblower program disregards these principles by allowing 
those whistleblowers who undergo a criminal prosecution and conviction to 
walk away from their prison time with money, excluding only those who 
planned and initiated the action.  In this way, the IRS whistleblower 
program creates a risk that such a program may prompt the occurrence of 
the very behavior that it seeks to prevent.151 
A more palatable alternative to the IRS’s current treatment of 
convicted whistleblowers may be to offer immunity or leniency in lieu of a 
bounty to those whistleblowers who are facing criminal prosecution––an 
opportunity that is already in existence and is likely to suffice in 
incentivizing culpable whistleblowers to come forward.152  Cooperation by 
 
(discussing the constitutional law implications of New York’s “Son of Sam” law); Jessica 
Yager, Investigating New York’s 2001 Son of Sam Law:  Problems with the Recent 
Extension of Tort Liability for People Convicted of Crimes, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 433, 438 
(2004) (outlining the history of New York’s “Son of Sam” law).  The sponsor of the original 
“Son of Sam law” bill described the need for the law as such:  “[i]t is abhorrent to one’s 
sense of justice and decency that an individual . . . can expect to receive large sums of 
money for his story once he is captured . . . .”  Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 108 (quoting 
Memorandum of Sen. Emanuel R. Gold, reprinted in NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE 
ANNUAL 1977, at 267). 
 150.  Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889).  Although Riggs and the Son of 
Sam laws were applied in the context of committing murder or causing physical injury to 
others, the basic premise of these words is a founding principle of the nation’s legal system. 
 151.  See Hansberry, supra note 59, at 211 (noting the potential dangers inherent in 
rewarding complicit behavior). 
 152.  See Michael D. Silberfarb, Justifying Punishment for White-Collar Crime:  A 
Utilitarian and Retributive Analysis of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 13 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 95, 
113 n.125 (2003) (asserting that a Department of Justice Status Report on whistleblower 
leniency programs suggests that “over a five year period use of informants was five times 
more likely to be responsible for detecting and prosecuting cartels than any other tool 
used.”); Omari Scott Simmons & James D. Dinnage, Innkeepers:  A Unifying Theory of the 
In-House Counsel Role, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 77, 102 (2011) (noting that “[a] prime 
illustration” of incentives and immunities for whistleblowers is the antitrust arena in which a 
corporation that is the first to report illegal cartel behavior to the Department of Justice may 
avoid criminal liability); see also Charlotte Dennett, Closing the Impunity Gap:  How 
Lawyers and Judges are Holding Higher-Ups Accountable, 37 VT. B.J. 32, 33 (2011) 
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criminal defendants in exchange for leniency is one of the most pervasive 
tools used by the government in criminal law enforcement and has also 
gained popularity in regulatory settings in recent years.153 
Miriam Baer has described the “Detection Effect” of cooperation, 
which enables the government to more successfully detect and prosecute 
wrongdoers, thereby creating a deterrent effect in a “rational violator” who 
faces an increased probability of getting caught.154  Cooperation allows the 
government to encourage defendants to proffer information at early stages 
of the investigation or prosecution, which may fill in holes in a case against 
a defendant, uncover new information about others involved, and provide 
insights about the defendant’s bargaining position.155  As Baer notes, “[i]t is 
no secret that the unequal bargaining position between prosecutor and 
defense attorney serves as an information-forcing device,” which generally 
allows a prosecutor to “enjoy monopoly power over the cooperation 
process.”156  In this way, not all defendants who cooperate will receive 
leniency, since the government has the power to limit the amount of 
cooperation agreements that it offers to defendants.157  In some instances, 
the government may have a more difficult time unearthing the truth when 
cooperators provide inaccurate or false information, as defendants may be 
tempted to minimize their own culpability in the wrongdoing, omit 
information about prior criminal conduct, or falsely implicate others.158 
For these reasons, the government denied Birkenfeld leniency and 
immunity.  He was ultimately prosecuted because of his relationship with 
his largest client, wealthy real-estate developer Igor Olenicoff, who 
cooperated with the Department of Justice investigation and avoided jail 
time by paying $52 million in fines and back taxes.159  Despite the immense 
amount of helpful information that Birkenfeld provided the government as 
a cooperator, he made one fatal mistake:  failing to disclose his relationship 
with Olenicoff.160  As such, Birkenfeld was charged with conspiracy to 
commit tax fraud, to which he pled guilty.161  Thomas Perrelli, former 
 
(noting that while high level officials who commit crimes are often granted immunity, 
whistleblowers are being prosecuted). 
 153.  Miriam Hechler Baer, Cooperation’s Cost, 88 WASH U. L. REV., 903, 905–06 
(2011). 
 154.  See id. at 917 (describing how the “Detection Effect” may change the behavior of 
“rational violators”). 
 155.  Id. at 920. 
 156.  Id.  
 157.  Id. at 920–21. 
 158.  See id. at 932–39 (discussing the aspects of cooperation that may reduce the overall 
“Detection Effect”). 
 159.  60 Minutes, supra note 71, at 10:16. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. 
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Associate Attorney General of the United States, commented that 
Birkenfeld would likely never have been prosecuted had he come forward 
from the beginning and told authorities of his relationship with 
Olenicoff.162  Ultimately it was claimed that Birkenfeld “had the last 
laugh,”163 as he was rewarded $104 million upon his exit from prison––
“more than $4,600 for every hour he spent in prison.”164  Birkenfeld’s 
attorney remarked that “[t]he IRS reward will help undo the tremendous 
damage caused by the ill-conceived decision of the U.S. Department of 
Justice to . . . prosecute Mr. Birkenfeld.”165 
In one of his media interviews, Birkenfeld consistently admitted that 
he was initially motivated to blow the whistle on UBS because of the desire 
for immunity.166  Birkenfeld claims that his motivations to inform 
governmental authorities of the tax fraud were mostly altruistic, as he 
willingly agreed to wear a wire to record conversations of his colleagues in 
exchange for full immunity for his participation in the fraud.167  In fact, 
nothing suggests that Birkenfeld’s motivation was prompted by a potential 
bounty, as the IRS whistleblower program, although enacted in 2006, had a 
very slow start.168  The IRS was still implementing the law well into 
2008,169 and the first bounty granted under the 2006 amendments was not 
until fiscal year 2011.170 
The impossibility of knowing what truly motivated Birkenfeld to 
come forward raises the question of whether would-be whistleblowers who 
 
 162.  Id. at 10:57. 
 163.  Id. at 12:30. 
 164.  Kocieniewski, supra note 68. 
 165.  Bittersweet Justice for Bradley Birkenfeld, EMPTYWHEEL (Sept. 11, 2012), 
http://www.emptywheel.net/2012/09/11/bittersweet-justice-for-bradley-birkenfeld (quoting 
Stephen Kohn); see Stier, supra note 97 (noting that whistleblowing can amount to 
“professional suicide” and financial rewards may compensate for this consequence); 
Jesselyn Radack, Government Missed Opportunities in UBS Whistleblower Case, GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.whistleblower.blog/42-2012/2234-
government-missed-opportunities-in-ubs-whistleblower-case (arguing that the IRS 
whistleblower program “should not be used to entrap whistleblowers into criminal 
prosecutions.”). 
 166.  60 Minutes, supra note 71, at 4:26. 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Birkenfeld’s Bonanza, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 11, 2012, 6:50 PM), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2012/09/whistleblowing. 
 169.  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., WHISTLEBLOWER ANNUAL REPORT (2008), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/whistleblower/whistleblower_annual_report.pdf. 
 170. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FISCAL YEAR 2012 REPORT TO CONGRESS 1 (2012), 
available at  http://www.irs.gov/pub/whistleblower/2012%20IRS%20Annual%20 
Whistleblower%20Report%20to%20Congress_mvw.pdf; Ryan Donmoyer, IRS Paid No 
Rewards in U.S. Whistleblower Program, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 15, 2010, 
www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-15/irs-paid-no-rewards-to-informants-in-u-s-
whistleblower-program.html. 
PACELLA_FINAL (ARTICLE 1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/25/2015  7:19 PM 
2015] BOUNTIES FOR BAD BEHAVIOR  375 
 
are culpable would be more likely to choose a bounty over leniency or 
immunity.  Although government authorities ultimately denied Birkenfeld 
immunity because of his failure to disclose his business relationship with 
Olenicoff, his story reveals that the availability of leniency or immunity to 
potential whistleblowers likely facing criminal prosecution may be enough 
to incentivize such persons to disclose wrongdoing.  In fact, empirical legal 
research has proposed that the motivation of whistleblowers to come 
forward may be due to a personal desire for remediation.  A novel 
empirical study by legal scholars Yuval Feldman and Orly Lobel measured 
the effects of different regulatory mechanisms, including monetary 
rewards, anti-retaliation rights, duties to report, and liability fines on the 
motivations of individuals to become whistleblowers.171  This research 
revealed that monetary rewards to induce whistleblowing frequently affect 
levels of reporting but identified an interesting distinction––that rewards 
like bounties may have a minimal effect on a person’s motivation to blow 
the whistle when the action for which they are reporting is perceived as 
morally offensive, such as in instances of fraud.172  Feldman and Lobel’s 
research determined that an individual’s perception of the severity of the 
wrongdoing for which they are reporting has an impact on whether they 
will decide to ultimately report––“the more outraged respondents feel about 
the illegal behavior, the more likely they are to report and to predict 
reporting by others.”173 
Comments as part of the SEC rulemaking process to implement Dodd-
Frank explored the notion that culpable whistleblowers facing possible 
criminal prosecution already have incentives beyond financial awards to 
come forward.  Some commentators opposed making bounties available to 
any whistleblower with unclean hands.174  Many commentators suggested 
that potential whistleblowers who are culpable are already incentivized to 
report their misconduct in return for leniency,175 including reduced 
sanctions or credit for cooperating176 and participating in cooperation or 
 
 171.  Feldman & Lobel, supra note 1. 
 172.  Id. at 1200–03; see Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Not Just Whistling Dixie:  The Case for 
Tax Whistleblowers in the States, 59 VILL. L. REV. 425, 464 (2014) (describing a report of 
the Ethics Resource Center, which showed that whistleblowers are increasingly motivated to 
report if the misconduct is significant with potential harm to others). 
 173.  Feldman & Lobel, supra note 1, at 1192.  
 174.  Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, Comment Letter on File No. S7-33-10, SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N (Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-200.pdf. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Fin. Serv. Roundtable, Comment Letter on File No. S7-33-10, SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N (Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-191.pdf. 
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voluntary disclosure programs that entities like the SEC and IRS already 
have in place.177 
As it stands now, the SEC and IRS will not make amnesty available to 
culpable whistleblowers just because they have come forward with 
information.  However, the SEC and IRS whistleblower programs 
recognize the valuable contributions that such persons offer, which both 
agencies consider when deciding whether to proceed with civil sanctions or 
criminal prosecutions.  The SEC rules implementing Dodd-Frank express 
that “[t]he fact that [one] become[s] a whistleblower and assist[s] in [SEC] 
investigations and enforcement actions does not preclude the [SEC] from 
bringing an action against [the whistleblower] based upon [his/her] own 
conduct in connection with violations of the Federal securities laws.”178  
Despite the SEC’s unwillingness to grant immunity to complicit 
whistleblowers, the SEC rules also state that it will take the 
whistleblower’s cooperation into consideration in accordance with its 
Cooperation Policy, which was strengthened in 2010.179  The SEC’s current 
Cooperation Policy attempts to reconcile the tension between holding 
culpable actors fully accountable for their misconduct while, at the same 
time, providing incentives for such persons to cooperate with law 
enforcement authorities.180  Adopted in the wake of the Bernie Madoff 
scandal, the SEC Cooperation Policy aims to incentivize individuals to 
come forward and cooperate with SEC investigations, which former SEC 
Enforcement Director Robert Khuzami called a potential “game-
changer”181 given the fraud that this policy is likely to uncover. 
To determine whether leniency and a civil enforcement action under 
SEC policy is warranted, the SEC examines the level of assistance 
provided by the whistleblower, the importance of the underlying matter, the 
societal interest of holding culpable persons accountable for their 
misconduct, and the appropriateness of cooperation credit based upon the 
profile of the specific individual.182  The SEC offers leniency in various 
forms.  Through a cooperation agreement, the Enforcement Division 
 
 177.  See Ass’n of Corp. Counsel, Comment Letter on File No. S7-33-10, SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N (Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-144.pdf 
(advocating for an SEC rule requiring the disclosure of conflicts of interest). 
 178.  17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-15 (2014). 
 179.  Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Policy Statement Concerning Cooperation 
by Individuals in its Investigations and Related Enforcement Actions (Jan. 19, 2010), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/policy/2010/34-61340.pdf.  
 180.  Id. at 3. 
 181.  Thomas A. Sporkin & Pavitra Bacon, SEC Cooperation Is Still More Art Than 
Science, LAW360 (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/501660/sec-cooperation-
is-still-more-art-than-science. 
 182.  Id. 
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recommends to the SEC that a cooperator should receive credit for 
cooperating in investigations if such person offers “substantial assistance” 
to SEC investigations and enforcement actions.183  The SEC may also offer 
deferred or non-prosecution agreements, or formal written agreements, in 
which it agrees not to carry out an enforcement action against a cooperator 
if such individual or company “agrees to cooperate fully and truthfully and 
to comply with certain reforms, controls and other undertakings.”184  The 
Cooperation Policy also now permits the SEC to make immunity requests 
to the Department of Justice to obtain testimony or witness cooperation 
from individuals like culpable whistleblowers who possess valuable 
information in exchange for protection against criminal prosecution.185  In 
cases when an individual asserts his or her Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination, the SEC may seek statutory immunity to obtain 
a court order compelling an individual to testify, so long as such request is 
approved by the U.S. Attorney General, or letter immunity, which is 
conferred by agreement between the individual and a U.S. Attorney’s 
Office.186  Both types of immunity prevent any statements or information to 
be used against the individual in any criminal case, excluding instances of 
perjury, giving a false statement, or obstruction of justice.187 
The SEC’s willingness to cooperate with a culpable whistleblower has 
proven to be successful, as the SEC reported an increase in the quality of 
tips it has received since the enactment of Dodd-Frank and adoption of the 
Cooperation Policy.188  From the establishment of the policy in August 
2011 until the end of fiscal year 2013, the SEC reports that it has received 
10,193 tips from whistleblowers.189 
Similarly, the IRS already has a system in place in which it offers 
leniency to those who voluntarily provide it with information.  The 
 
 183.  Robert S. Khuzami, Dir. of Div. of Enforcement, Speech by SEC Staff:  Remarks at 
News Conference Announcing Enforcement Cooperation Initiative and New Senior Leaders, 
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Jan. 13, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/ 
spch011310rsk.htm. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 132-34 
(2013), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf. 
 186.  Id. at 132. 
 187.  Id. 
 188.  Christina N. Davilas & Steven W. Hansen, SEC Announces First Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement With An Individual, BINGHAM, Nov. 22, 2013, 
https://www.bingham.com/Alerts/2013/11/SEC-Announces-First-Deferred-Prosecution-
Agreement-With-An-Individual. 
 189.  Id.; see SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT ON THE DODD-FRANK 
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM  20 (2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ 
owb/annual-report-2014.pdf (discussing whistleblower tips and incentives in fiscal year 
2013). 
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existence of this program and the fact that Bradley Birkenfeld had the 
possibility of being granted immunity offer support for the suggestion that 
cooperation measures already in existence may be sufficient to incentivize 
culpable whistleblowers to report to the IRS,190 which would eliminate the 
need to make any bounties available to whistleblowers who are criminally 
convicted. 
The Criminal Investigation (“CI”) unit of the IRS possesses the power 
to decide whether criminal prosecution for tax violations is merited.191  CI 
is the criminal enforcement arm of the IRS that investigates potential 
criminal tax violations and related financial crimes.  It consists of special 
agents who are trained in unique investigatory skills, computer evidence, 
and forensic technology to recover financial data that may be hidden by 
electronic means such as encryption or password protection.192  Once CI 
detects fraud, it conducts a criminal investigation to obtain evidence, 
including “interviews of third party witnesses, conducting surveillance, 
executing search warrants, subpoenaing bank records, and reviewing 
financial data.”193  After all of the evidence is collected and analyzed, CI 
special agents will either determine that no criminal activity has been 
substantiated and discontinue the investigation or, if sufficient evidence of 
criminal activity has been found, prepare a written report of the findings 
and recommend prosecution.194  These special agent reports are then 
reviewed by several other layers within CI and are then forwarded to the 
Tax Division of the Department of Justice for prosecution, which, if 
accepted, will allow the CI special agent to assist prosecutors in preparing 
for trial.195  The IRS is clear that “[t]he ultimate goal of an IRS Criminal 
Investigation prosecution recommendation is to obtain a conviction or 
plea,” suggesting approximately 3,000 criminal prosecutions per year.196 
In determining whether a criminal prosecution should be 
recommended, CI must find that the evidence is sufficient to “establish 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and a reasonable probability of conviction 
 
 190.  See Samantha H. Scavron, In Pursuit of Offshore Tax Evaders:  The Increased 
Importance of International Cooperation in Tax Treaty Negotiations after United States v. 
UBS AG, 9 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 157, 181 (2010) (noting that there may now 
be less of an incentive for complicit whistleblowers to come forward given Birkenfeld’s 
prosecution and incarceration).  
 191.  Criminal Investigation (CI) At-A-Glance, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Criminal-Investigation-(CI)-At-a-Glance (last visited Feb. 25, 2015). 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  How Criminal Investigations are Initiated, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
http://www.irs.gov/uac/How-Criminal-Investigations-Are-Initiated (last visited Feb. 25, 
2015). 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Id. 
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must exist.”197  In making this determination, CI will consider factors such 
as “whether a voluntary disclosure was made, whether dual or successive 
prosecution exists, the health, age and mental condition of the taxpayer and 
whether solicitation of returns has occurred.  The presence of any of the 
foregoing may impact on willfulness and significantly impair or eliminate 
the probability of conviction.”198  Therefore, it is fully within the IRS’s 
discretion to determine whether criminal prosecution is appropriate. 
Although a voluntary disclosure on the part of the noncompliant 
taxpayer will not guarantee immunity outright, leniency for individuals 
who have voluntarily come forward with information is a long-standing 
IRS practice.199  As the Internal Revenue Service Manual clearly states, a 
“voluntary disclosure may result in prosecution not being 
recommended.”200  A voluntary disclosure occurs when a communication is 
made to the IRS that is:   
 
truthful, timely, and complete, and when:  (A) [t]he taxpayer 
shows a willingness to cooperate (and does in fact cooperate) 
with the IRS in determining his or her correct tax liability; and 
(B) [t]he taxpayer makes good faith arrangements with the IRS to 
pay in full the tax, interest, and any penalties determined by the 
IRS to be applicable.201 
 
Disclosures will only be considered voluntary if a CI investigation has not 
yet been made.202 
The IRS will provide leniency to those who voluntarily disclose 
information because incentivizing individuals or businesses that are liable 
 
 197.  INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE MANUAL § 38.3.1.3 (2004), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part38/irm_38-003-001.html [hereinafter IRS MANUAL]. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. § 38.3.1.3.1; see Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program Frequently Asked 
Questions and Answers, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/ 
International-Taxpayers/Offshore-Voluntary-Disclosure-Program-Frequently-Asked-
Questions-and-Answers-2012-Revised (last visited Feb. 25, 2015) (stating that the CI takes 
voluntary disclosures into account when recommending whether an offender should be 
criminally prosecuted); 2012 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program, INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., http://www.irs.gov/uac/2012-Offshore-Voluntary-Disclosure-Program (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2015) (noting that the IRS has instituted a program to work with taxpayers who 
voluntarily come forward in order to reduce their penalties); The Use of Voluntary 
Disclosure Initiatives, supra note 82, at 499 (noting the IRS’s long history of encouraging 
voluntary disclosure of tax evasion). 
 200.  IRS MANUAL, supra note 197, § 38.3.1.3.1. 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  Id.; Marcotte, supra note 88, at 7 (noting that the IRS will generally not 
recommend any criminal prosecution “[a]s long as a taxpayer makes a truthful, timely, and 
complete disclosure before the disclosed information is discovered by the government”). 
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to come forward with information is of utmost importance in the tax 
arena.203  “The compliance function of IRS is principally concerned with 
protecting and enhancing voluntarily compliant conduct by taxpayers.”204  
The IRS relies extensively on the honesty of taxpayers in reporting their 
income in a system where “[m]any taxpayers are not willing to assist the 
IRS” by providing accurate and truthful tax returns.205  Dishonesty of 
taxpayers has given rise to the ever-growing “tax gap,”206 which is the 
difference between the amount of taxes that are owed to the government 
and those that are actually collected.207  The IRS’s last report of the tax gap 
was made in 2006, which revealed that the gap for that year was $450 
billion, up from the $345 billion that was previously reported in 2001.208  
Research has revealed that the tax gap has steadily increased since 1973.209 
IRS leniency initiatives for voluntary disclosure have proven 
successful.  After the IRS discovered the details of the UBS tax fraud 
through Bradley Birkenfeld,210 it created the first official voluntary 
disclosure program for delinquent taxpayers in 2009, offering such persons 
the option to report past due taxes in return for reduced penalties, a reduced 
likelihood of criminal prosecution, or both.211  Due to the successes of the 
2009 initiative, the IRS offered the program again in 2011 and 2012, 
proving enormously successful in allowing the IRS to resolve a large 
number of cases without tapping into the resources of lengthy 
investigations.212  In June 2012, the IRS announced that its voluntary 
 
 203.  David T. Moldenhauer, Penalty Protection Opinions and Advisor Conflicts of 
Interest, 27 AKRON TAX J. 55, 56 n.4 (2012). 
 204.  Id. (quoting AM. INST. CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, REPORT ON CIVIL TAX 
PENALTIES:  THE NEED FOR REFORM 2–3 (2009)). 
 205.  Leah A. Kahl, Incriminatory Effects of Compliance with IRS Subpoenas for 
Personal Documents:  An Analysis of Current Approaches, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
323, 327 (1996) (discussing an IRS survey revealing that one-fifth of taxpayers cheat on 
their tax returns). 
 206.  Morse, supra note 30, at 2. 
 207.  Michelle M. Kwon, The Tax Man’s Ethics:  Four of the Hardest Ethical Questions 
for an IRS Lawyer, 9 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 371, 393 (2011). 
 208.  The Tax Gap, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/uac/The-Tax-Gap 
(last visited Feb. 25, 2015). 
 209. Karie Davis-Nozemack, Unequal Burdens in EITC Compliance, 31 LAW & INEQ. 
37, 41 n.24 (2012) (citing JAMES M. BICKLEY, CONG. RES. SERV., R42739, TAX GAP, TAX 
ENFORCEMENT, AND TAX COMPLIANCE PROPOSALS IN THE 112TH CONGRESS 3–5 (2012)); 
Bret Wells, New Schedule UTP: “Uncertain Tax Positions in the Age of Transparency,” 63 
BAYLOR L. REV. 392, 394–95 (2011); see James Alm & Jay A. Soled, The Internal Revenue 
Code and Automobiles:  A Case Study of Taxpayer Noncompliance, 14 FLA. TAX REV. 419, 
419 (2013) (noting that the tax gap has remained large over the last decade). 
 210.  See supra Section II.A (discussing Bradley Birkenfeld’s voluntary disclosure). 
 211.  The Use of Voluntary Disclosure Initiatives, supra note 82, at 501.  
 212.  Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program Frequently Asked Questions and Answers, 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-Taxpayers/ 
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disclosure programs had brought in more than $5 billion in back taxes, 
interest, and penalties from over 33,000 voluntary disclosures made.213 
Given the essential and historical role that voluntary disclosures have 
played in the recovery of billions of dollars of lost tax revenue, it is clear 
that the IRS is heavily reliant on the willingness of individuals, businesses, 
and whistleblowers in general to come forward.  Due to the promise of 
reduced penalties and possible avoidance of criminal prosecution, sources 
have noted that voluntary disclosure programs help culpable individuals 
overcome the fear of being discovered and prosecuted.214  Given the 
notable successes of the program in detecting tax fraud and allowing 
thousands to avoid criminal prosecution, the program seems to offer a win-
win situation for both a culpable whistleblower and the IRS. 
B. The “Planned and Initiated” Determination 
The amended IRS whistleblower program was modeled after the False 
Claims Act (“FCA”),215 which, as discussed in Section II.B, was enacted 
during the time of the Civil War and is premised on the notion that it “takes 
a rogue to catch a rogue.”216  As discussed, the IRS will reduce a bounty 
award to a whistleblower who “planned and initiated” the action that led to 
the tax non-compliance and will deny a reward to a whistleblower who is 
convicted because of this role, while allowing bounties for all other 
convicted whistleblowers.217  The IRS whistleblower program’s use of the 
words “planned and initiated” is taken directly from the FCA.  Section 
3730(d) of the FCA states that if a qui tam plaintiff planned and initiated 
 
Offshore-Voluntary-Disclosure-Program-Frequently-Asked-Questions-and-Answers-2012-
Revised  (last visited Feb. 25, 2015). 
 213.  IRS Says Offshore Effort Tops $5 Billion, Announces New Details on the Voluntary 
Disclosure Program and Closing of Offshore Loophole, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-Says-Offshore-Effort-Tops-$5-Billion,-Announces-New-
Details-on-the-Voluntary-Disclosure-Program-and-Closing-of-Offshore-Loophole (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2015). 
 214.  See, e.g., Robert W. Wood, Should You Opt Out of IRS Offshore Amnesty?, FORBES 
(Oct. 4, 2013, 1:47 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2013/10/04/should-you-
opt-out-of-irs-offshore-amnesty (discussing the various considerations in opting out of the 
offshore voluntary disclosure program ); Miriam L. Fisher et al., IRS Provides Guidance for 
Ongoing Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program, LATHAM & WATKINS (July 19, 2012), 
www.lw.com/ongoing-offshore-voluntary-compliance.  For an analysis of other ways in 
which the IRS whistleblower program may be improved, such as the imposition of an 
internal reporting requirement and anti-retaliation protections, see Aldinger, supra note 122, 
at 939–44. 
 215. Radack Letter, supra note 35, at 1; Kwon, supra note 104, at 457; Feldman & 
Lobel, supra note 1, at 1168. 
 216.  See supra Section II.B (discussing the enactment of the FCA). 
 217.  26 U.S.C. § 7623(b)(3) (2012 & Supp. I 2013). 
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the wrongdoing upon which the action is based, his or her award may be 
reduced.218  Notably, the FCA also states that if the qui tam plaintiff is 
convicted of criminal conduct arising from his or her role in the 
wrongdoing, he or she is barred from receiving any award and is dismissed 
from the action.219  Therefore, the IRS whistleblower program diverges 
from the FCA in that it makes bounties available to those who are 
convicted, an approach that none of the other federal whistleblower 
programs take. 
Differentiating those who “planned and initiated” from those who 
participated in the violation to a lesser degree is obviously a key distinction 
to be made.  It would have made the difference in whether Bradley 
Birkenfeld walked away with a $104 million bounty.  Despite the fact that 
the “planned and initiated” distinction is the only limitation on whether the 
IRS will grant a bounty to a criminally convicted whistleblower, Congress 
has provided no guidance as to the meaning of these words.220  On August 
12, 2014, the IRS and Treasury Department issued final regulations 
implementing the amended IRS whistleblower program of Section 7623 
after publishing proposed regulations on December 28, 2012.221  Under the 
final regulations, the IRS determines that a claimant planned and initiated 
the underlying acts if he or she:   
 
(A) [d]esigned, structured, drafted, arranged, formed the plan 
leading to, or otherwise planned, an underlying act, (B) [t]ook 
steps to start, introduce, originate, set into motion, promote or 
otherwise initiate an underlying act, and (C) [k]new or had reason 
to know that an underpayment of tax or actions described in 
section 7623(a)(2) could result from planning and initiating the 
underlying act.222 
 
 218.  31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(3) (2012 & Supp. I 2013) (emphasis added).  
 219.  Id; see Kwon, supra note 104, at 458–60 (noting that while there are similarities 
between the FCA and the IRS whistleblower program, there are also differences, such as the 
whistleblower’s more pronounced involvement in a qui tam action, court involvement in 
FCA actions as opposed to whistleblower claims with the IRS that are primarily 
administrative proceedings, and the requirement to prove that a defendant has defrauded the 
government in a qui tam action whereas fraud is not a prerequisite to receiving an award 
under the IRS whistleblower program—“[t]ax whistleblowers may recover from taxpayers’ 
innocent mistakes or uncertainty in the tax laws.”). 
 220.  Awards for Information Relating to Detecting Underpayments of Tax or Violations 
of the Internal Revenue Laws, 77 Fed. Reg. 74,798, 74,803 (proposed Dec. 18, 2012) (to be 
codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301) [hereinafter Proposed IRS Rules]. 
 221.  Awards for Information Relating to Detecting Underpayments of Tax or Violations 
of the Internal Revenue Laws, 79 Fed. Reg. 47,246 (finalized Aug. 12, 2014) (to be codified 
at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301) [hereinafter Final IRS Rules]. 
 222.  Id. at 47,273.  In the final regulations, the IRS and Treasury Department noted that 
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If the IRS whistleblower office determines that a claimant meets the 
threshold for planning and initiating the underlying act, it will then 
categorize the extent to which that claimant was involved as “primary, 
significant, [or] moderate” and reduce the bounty accordingly.223  The 
regulations indicate that the “primary, significant or moderate” categories 
are intended to “promote consistency, fairness, and transparency in an 
award determination process that is inherently subjective.”224  Once this 
determination is made, the IRS will reduce the awards by 67 to 100 percent 
for a primary planner or initiator, by 34 to 66 percent for a significant 
planner or initiator, and by 0 to 33 percent for a moderate planner or 
initiator.225 
After the publication of the proposed regulations in December 2012, 
many commentators expressed concern that the IRS regulations expand the 
definition of “planned and initiated” beyond the original meaning of the 
words as evidenced by the FCA’s legislative history, which considers 
whether the individual was the “principal architect” of the wrongdoing.226  
Unfortunately, the legislative history of the 2006 amendments to the IRS 
whistleblower program does not shed light on these discrepancies, as any 
explanation of the rationale behind providing bounties to convicted 
whistleblowers and the intended meaning of “planned and initiated” is 
lacking.227  Commentators argued that the “planned and initiated” limitation 
should only “apply narrowly to principal wrongdoers” by encompassing 
those persons who “both originated, introduced or started the scheme and 
also designed, drafted and arranged the scheme.”228 
 
the whistleblower need not be the sole person involved in planning and initiating the act, 
rather “[a] whistleblower who merely furnishes typing, reproducing, or other mechanical 
assistance in implementing one or more underlying acts will not be treated as initiating any 
underlying act.  A whistleblower who is a junior employee acting at the direction, and under 
the control, of a senior employee will not be treated as initiating any underlying act.”  Id. 
 223.  Id. 
 224.  Id. at 47,262. 
 225.  Id. at 47,273. 
 226.  Id at 47,261; Radack Letter, supra note 35, at 2; Public Hearing on Proposed 
Regulations 26 C.F.R. 1, Internal Revenue Serv., Awards for Information Relating to 
Detecting Underpayments of Tax or Violations of the Internal Revenue Laws (Apr. 10, 
2013), [hereinafter IRS Public Hearings], http://www.taxwhistleblowerreport.com/ 
Unofficial%20Transcript%20Reg%20Hearing%20April%202013.pdf (statement of Neil V. 
Getnick, Chairperson, Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund). 
 227.  See Davis-Nozemack & Webber, supra note 16, at 94 n.85 (“Little legislative 
history is available for the 2006 amendments.  This is likely because the whistleblower 
amendments were only a small, uncontroversial part of the much larger Tax Relief and 
Health Care Act of 2006, enacted on December 20, 2006.”). 
 228.  See Radack Letter, supra note 35, at 2-3 (citing 134 CONG. REC. S16697 (daily ed. 
Oct. 18, 1988) (statement of Senator Grassley) (stating that the amendment would “apply 
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The proposed regulations included those who “knew or had reason to 
know that there were tax implications” as planners and initiators.229  
Pinpointing the IRS’s inclusion of contributors and advisors in this 
category, commentators argued that this category was unreasonably broad, 
straying from the original vision of Congress under the False Claims Act.230  
Senator Grassley himself, the co-author of the 2006 amendments to the IRS 
whistleblower program, echoed these concerns, recognizing that “a delicate 
balance [needs] to be struck between weeding out bad actors while not 
discouraging knowledgeable insiders from coming forward.”231 
Others expressed concern that the examination of Bradley 
Birkenfeld’s role in the UBS tax fraud offered no explanation of how the 
IRS will make the “planned and initiated” determination in the future.  One 
source noted the probability that the IRS’s determination with respect to 
Birkenfeld is not likely to help clarify how the IRS would distinguish 
between a whistleblower who “planned and initiated” the scheme and one 
who did not.232 
The final regulations demonstrate the efforts of the IRS and Treasury 
Department to appease these concerns.  Regardless, the “principal 
architect” approach was ultimately not adopted––the IRS notes that a single 
planner or initiator is not required in the statutory language, which provides 
for the possibility that multiple individuals may have planned or initiated a 
 
narrowly to principal wrongdoers”); 124 CONG. REC. H10637 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1988) 
(statement of Rep. Berman) (“The amendment we are voting on today will allay any 
criticism that the False Claim [sic] Act will encourage principal wrongdoers to file false 
claims actions solely motivated by the desire to profit from their own previous 
wrongdoing”); 134 CONG. REC. S16697 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1988) (statement of Senator 
DeConcini) (expressing that the amendment was designed to prevent those who are “the 
main force behind a false claims scheme” from recovering)); see also IRS Public Hearings, 
supra note 226, at 23 (statement of Mr. Getnick) (expressing that the IRS’s inclusion of 
“drafted” within the definition of “planned” “would seemingly penalize innocent employees 
who merely drafted a document at the direction of his or her superiors,” and that the 
inclusion of “promoted” within the definition of “initiated” would “appear to penalize those 
who did not actually initiate anything but may only have become involved in the fraud 
scheme well after it began.”). 
 229.  Proposed IRS Rules, supra note 221, at 74,803. 
 230.  Radack Letter, supra note 35, at 3. 
 231.  See Letter from Charles E. Grassley, U.S. Senator, to Dep’t. of Treasury and 
Internal Revenue Serv. (Jan. 28, 2013), at 3, available at http://kmblegal.com/wordpress/ 
wp-content/uploads/130128-Grassley-to-IRS-re-WB-Regs.pdf (“There is no reason for the 
IRS to be recreating the wheel with regard to planners and initiators.  There is already 
established law in this area with respect to FCA claims.”). 
 232.  Coder, supra note 95 (citing Barbara T. Kaplan of Greenberg Traurig LLP); see 
Saul Ewing LLP, supra note 78 (“[P]otential claimants and representatives are still left 
without full clarification as to exactly how much participation in a tax fraud scheme is 
permissible before the ‘planned and initiated’ exclusion applies.”). 
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tax violation.233  The final regulations do change “knew or had reason to 
know that there were tax implications” to “knew or had reason to know that 
a tax underpayment or a violation of the internal revenue laws could 
result,”234 which is more consistent with the specific tax matters that could 
be implicated. 
In an effort to provide guidance as to how the planner/initiator role 
will be determined, the final regulations include five examples offering 
hypothetical factual scenarios to illustrate this determination.  The 
regulations note that someone who merely furnishes assistance to another 
will not be treated as a planner/initiator, thereby ensuring that 
whistleblowers who are junior associates acting at the direction of a 
supervisor to conduct research or even draft documents would not be 
subject to a reduced bounty.235  Examples of whistleblowers meeting the 
planner/initiator determination, whether on a primary, significant or 
moderate level, involve a supervisor who incorrectly but in good faith 
designed a financial strategy resulting in tax deficiencies (moderate); an 
independent planner of a high-risk tax avoidance transaction that was 
subsequently approved by the company’s officers and board of directors 
(significant); and a financial planner who designed a product that the IRS 
identified as an abusive tax avoidance scheme, marketed it, and disguised 
its true nature, resulting in tax penalties (primary).236 
Although these examples shed light on the planner/initiator 
determination, they do not encompass the myriad scenarios and situations 
where one’s level of involvement is uncertain or varied.  In contrast, the 
SEC avoids this dilemma altogether by basing bounty eligibility not on the 
question of whether a whistleblower “planned and initiated” the 
wrongdoing but on whether the whistleblower was convicted for taking 
part, even narrowly, in the scheme.  In this way, the eligibility 
determination turns on whether a prosecutor has decided to charge the 
whistleblower with a crime and whether that ultimately leads to a guilty 
plea or a verdict through the criminal justice system, rather than through an 
 
 233.  Final IRS Rules, supra note 221, at 47,261. 
 234.  Id. 
 235.  Id. at 47,273–74.  One hypothetical offers a situation in which a whistleblower is a 
human resources employee who organizes, schedules, and conducts job fairs to hire 
temporary, seasonal employees.  Id. at 47,274.  This whistleblower was not responsible for 
and had no knowledge of how the seasonal employees would be classified for federal tax 
purposes.  Id.  After discovering that the company had classified the seasonal employees 
hired as independent contractors, the whistleblower made a report to the IRS, which resulted 
in an investigation revealing deficiencies in tax payments and penalties.  Id.  Under these 
circumstances, the whistleblower’s bounty would not be subject to a reduction because 
he/she did not know and had no reason to know that his/her actions could result in an 
underpayment of tax.  Id. 
 236.  Id. at 47,274. 
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assessment by an administrative agency that is subject to broad 
interpretations.  Utilizing a criminal conviction as the measure of 
culpability for bounty eligibility avoids the potential confusion that 
emerges in attempting to determine whether an individual played a key role 
in a fraud as opposed to a more nominal role––a distinction that is often 
hard to ascertain. 
IV. RECENT SEC TRENDS  
This section is intended to anticipate counterarguments suggesting that 
the fields of tax law and securities law are so distinct as to justify their 
differences concerning culpable whistleblowers.  In particular, it may be 
argued that securities fraud reporting is not comparable to tax fraud 
reporting and that their bounty incentive structures must, therefore, be 
different.237  The author does not dispute the fact that the IRS and the SEC 
are based on divergent fundamental missions.  While the main tenet of the 
SEC is the disclosure of information to protect against the potential 
asymmetry of information between issuers of securities and investors in 
those securities,238 the mission of the IRS is to ensure that the public is 
compliant with their tax reporting obligations.239  While the two agencies 
 
 237.  Dave Ebersole, Blowing the Whistle on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions, 
6 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 123, 131 (2011) (citing Feldman & Lobel, supra note 1, at 
1193–95); cf. Ventry, supra note 172, at 448 (refuting the argument that tax law is so 
distinct from other areas of the law as to render comparisons to tax law too complex and 
ambiguous). 
 238.  See The Investor’s Advocate:  How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market 
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Feb. 25, 2015) (“This [disclosure of 
information] provides a common pool of knowledge for all investors to use to judge for 
themselves whether to buy, sell, or hold a particular security.  Only through the steady flow 
of timely, comprehensive, and accurate information can people make sound investment 
decisions.”); Paula J. Dalley, The Use and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory System, 34 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1089, 1093–94, 1096 (2007) (noting that the securities acts established 
“[t]he archetype of the use of disclosure as a regulatory scheme . . . [b]ecause information 
asymmetries cause market participants to demand compensatory premia, [and] a disclosure 
policy that reduces those asymmetries will improve the price-setting function of the 
market”).  Commentators on the origins of federal securities regulation often quote Louis 
Brandeis, former associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, who famously expressed, 
“[s]unlight is . . . the best of disinfectants . . . .”  Dalley, supra, at 1096 (noting common 
reference to LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 
92). 
 239.  The Agency, Its Mission, and Statutory Authority, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
http://www.irs.gov/uac/The-Agency,-its-Mission-and-Statutory-Authority (last visited Feb. 
25, 2015); see David Freeman Engstrom, Whither Whistleblowing? Bounty Regimes, 
Regulatory Context, and the Challenge of Optimal Design, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 
605, 625 (2014) (noting that “tax law is relatively determinate” in the sense that the Internal 
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may have different goals, their need for information from complicit 
individuals is comparable.  Such individuals, whether subject to 
investigation or penalties from either the IRS or SEC, may be incentivized 
to report through the desire for leniency or immunity. 
Aside from drawing parallels due to a similar need for information, 
the identities of the two agencies have been converging.  Recent trends 
have shown that the SEC and IRS, although designed to fulfill separate 
needs in the law, increasingly resemble each other in embodying the role of 
a “punisher.”240  Legal scholars have begun to comment on the SEC’s trend 
of utilizing tools that have traditionally been confined to the criminal 
enforcement arena.241 
The statutory enforcement authority of the SEC does not include 
criminal sanctions, which are instead vested in the Department of Justice.242  
In contrast, the IRS is a federal criminal investigative agency with the 
authority to utilize criminal police powers and sanctions,243 including 
search warrants, interrogations and surveillance.244  The SEC Enforcement 
Division, the entity tasked with the investigation of possible securities 
violations that recommends SEC action when appropriate,245 has 
increasingly redefined itself as a punishing entity, especially in the 
aftermath of the Bernie Madoff fraud and the SEC’s inability to detect it 
sooner.246  As one scholar notes, the SEC “has recast itself as an all-purpose 
investigator and punisher” in recent times, removing roadblocks to 
initiating and pursuing investigations.247  At the time that the SEC began 
this shift, former SEC Chief of Enforcement Robert Khuzami recruited two 
former prosecutors from the U.S. Attorney’s office rather than filling these 
 
Revenue Code includes many “rule-like commands” as compared to other regulatory areas). 
 240.  Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U. L. REV. 577, 580, 610 (2012). 
 241.  Id. at 610 (noting that the recent changes within the SEC’s Enforcement Division, 
partially resulting from the discovery of Bernard Madoff’s fraud in December 2008); 
Matthew P. Allen, The SEC Cooperation Initiative and Its Criminal Roots, MILLER 
CANFIELD, Feb. 2013, at 1, available at http://www.millercanfield.com/publications-articles-
328.html; Steve Thorpe, Asked & Answered:  Matthew P. Allen on SEC Cooperation 
Initiative, MOTION MAGAZINE, Apr. 23, 2011, available at http://www.legalnews.com/ 
oakland/1375212/; Russell G. Ryan, Don’t Let the SEC Punish Too Harshly, BLOOMBERG, 
Aug. 15, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-15/don-t-let-the-sec-punish-too-
harshly.html (noting that “civil SEC remedies have no legitimate role in punishing crimes”). 
 242.  Allyson Poulos, Rachel Cox, Claire Burks & Chandra Kurien, Securities Fraud, 50 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1479, 1544 (2013). 
 243.  Criminal Enforcement, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Feb. 4, 2014, 
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Criminal-Enforcement-1. 
 244.  IRS MANUAL, supra note 197, §§ 9.4.5, 9.4.6, 9.4.9. 
 245.  Division of Enforcement, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.sec. 
gov/divisions/enforce.shtml. 
 246.  Baer, supra note 240, at 610. 
 247.  Id. 
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positions with career SEC attorneys.248  Khuzami enacted a number of 
changes that were aimed at making the SEC Enforcement Division look 
and act more like a criminal law enforcement agency,249 including 
reorganizing the division into subject matter units dedicated to 
investigating specific types of noncompliance and an announcement of the 
intention to expand cooperation programs from entities to individual 
cooperators––a tool already used by criminal law enforcement.250 
The 2013 appointment of Mary Jo White as Chair of the SEC, former 
U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, is also a signal that 
the SEC is committed to increasing its role as a punishing entity using tools 
resembling criminal enforcement agencies.  With a reputation as “a tough 
litigator,” White, the first career prosecutor and litigator to chair the SEC, 
filled key positions in the enforcement division nearly instantaneously with 
people she knew well in that arena.251  Extensive public comment has noted 
the more aggressive tone that the SEC embodies due to White’s role, 
including admissions of guilt by violators, the rejection of settlements to 
bring more cases to trial, and a growing perception that the SEC is 
“tougher” than it was before.252 
The SEC Cooperation Policy discussed in Section III.A is one of the 
primary tools that the SEC has developed to improve its enforcement 
mechanisms, a program that was “mold[ed] . . . in the image of criminal 
cooperation tools employed by the U.S. Department of Justice,” thereby 
continuing the “criminalization” of the SEC’s procedures and policies.253  
 
 248.  Id. 
 249.  Id. at 623. 
 250.  Id. at 610. 
 251.  Nicholas Lemann, Street Cop, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 11, 2013, available at  
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/11/11/131111fa_fact_lemann?currentPage=all. 
 252.  See, e.g., Sheelah Kolhatkar,  Mary Jo White Is the Woman Who Makes Wall Street 
Admit Guilt, BLOOMBERG BUS. WEEK, Oct. 16, 2013, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-10-16/mary-jo-white-is-the-woman-who-
makes-wall-street-admit-guilt#p2 (noting White’s new policy of demanding admissions); 
Steven Perlberg, Why Friends Call SEC Chair Mary Jo White ‘Sid Vicious,’ BUS. INSIDER, 
Nov. 4, 2013, http://www.businessinsider.com/the-new-yorker-profile-of-mary-jo-white-
2013-1 (noting that White’s appointment has created a “tougher” SEC); Emily Flitter & 
Sarah Lynch, SEC Rejects Settlement with Fund Manager Phil Falcone, REUTERS, July 19, 
2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/19/us-sec-falcone-settlement-
idUSBRE96I0OF20130719 (discussing White’s recent rejection of a proposed settlement 
with hedge fund manager Philip Falcone and White’s intent “to be more aggressive in 
dealing with settlements and to take more cases to trial”). 
 253.  Allen, supra note 241, at 1; see Dina ElBoghdady, SEC Shows Leniency to Hedge-
Fund Administrator in a First for Agency, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/sec-shows-leniency-to-hedge-fund-
administrator-in-a-first-for-agency/2013/11/12/c976ae4e-4bce-11e3-be6b-
d3d28122e6d4_story.html (detailing the SEC’s decision to “forego significant enforcement 
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These tools include SEC requests for immunity from the U.S. Attorney 
General and deferred and non-prosecution agreements.254  The SEC’s shift 
toward historically criminal tools demonstrates a greater emphasis “on the 
SEC’s ‘mission’ to ‘work cooperatively with criminal authorities, to share 
information, and to coordinate their investigations with parallel criminal 
investigations when appropriate.’”255 
Criminal and civil law are clearly distinct.  While criminal laws look 
to the existence of mens rea, or the defendant’s guilty mind, civil laws tend 
to be concerned with liability from an objective standpoint.256  While civil 
suits provide redress for disputes between private persons or parties, 
criminal suits prosecuted by the government are intended to punish those 
whose conduct violates the moral judgments of society.257  The Supreme 
Court’s recent examinations of the criminal/civil distinction have noted that 
the goals of deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation do not alone have 
the capability of transforming a seeming civil statute into a criminal 
statute.258  Instead, the Supreme Court has pinpointed that the key 
difference between criminal and civil law is that criminal law has a 
retributive purpose “authoriz[ing] the state to impose sanctions to express 
the community’s blame or condemnation for the commission of an 
 
action” against a former hedge fund administrator because he helped the SEC uncover fraud 
at his former fund); see also Gregory S. Bruch & Elizabeth P. Gray, SEC Announces 
Measures to Encourage Cooperation and Names Specialized Unit Chiefs, THE METRO. 
CORPORATE COUNSEL, Mar. 2010, at 20, available at http://www.willkie.com/~/media/Files/ 
Publications/2010/03/SEC%20Announces%20Measures%20to%20Encourage%20Cooperati
on%20__/Files/SEC%20Announces%20Measures%20to%20Encouragepdf/FileAttachment/
SEC%20Announces%20Measures%20to%20Encourage.pdf (describing how the SEC began 
to use deferred prosecution agreements and written cooperation agreements to incentivize 
whistleblowing); Gideon Mark, Private FCPA Enforcement, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 419 (2012) 
(noting that the SEC first used a deferred prosecution agreement in 2011 and, together with 
the Department of Justice, the SEC entered into 29 deferred and non-prosecution 
agreements in 2011); Russell G. Ryan, Bill Would Put Dangerous Weapons in SEC Hands, 
FIN. ADVISOR (Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.fa-mag.com/news/-bill-would-put-dangerous-
weapons-in-sec-hands-11640.html (noting that Congress has been “incrementally blurring 
the line between civil regulatory enforcement and criminal punishment, reflecting an eerie 
indifference to due process and the proper constitutional allocation of law-enforcement 
responsibility”). 
 254.  Allen, supra note 241, at 1. 
 255.  Id. at 2 (citing OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT 
MANUAL 104 (2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/ 
enforcementmanual.pdf.). 
 256.  Id. at 4 (emphasis added). 
 257.  JOHN J. COUND, JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, ARTHUR R. MILLER & JOHN E. SEXTON, 
CIVIL PROCEDURE, CASES AND MATERIALS 2 (2001). 
 258.  Symposium, Punishment Without Culpability, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653, 
679–82 (2012) (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 
346, 350-54 (1997)). 
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unlawful act.”259  Although objectives like deterrence and incapacitation are 
associated with punishment, these goals have also been found to be 
“compatible with” civil regulatory statutes, thereby failing to serve as the 
main factor that differentiates criminal law from civil law.260  The 
imposition of punishment thus distinguishes a criminally convicted 
individual from a culpable one.261  As legal scholar John F. Stinneford 
notes:  
  
The centrality of retributive purpose in distinguishing criminal 
from civil laws reflects an obvious but often-overlooked fact:  A 
defendant who is subjected to criminal punishment loses more 
than property or even liberty:  he also loses his good name.  He is 
labeled by the community as a person worthy of blame, stigma, 
and retribution.  He is labeled a criminal.  This is a very serious 
thing indeed, and it calls for the protections the Constitution 
affords criminal defendants.262 
 
The fact that the SEC has increasingly manifested itself as having a 
retributive purpose utilizing criminal cooperation tools suggests that the 
line between these federal agencies may be becoming more blurred.  Such a 
premise may serve to challenge the perception that the SEC and IRS are so 
distinct as to justify any varying treatment of criminally convicted 
whistleblowers. 
CONCLUSION 
As early as the Civil War era, the False Claims Act’s theory that it 
“takes a rogue to catch a rogue”263 has justified rewarding those with 
unclean hands for the valuable information that they are able to provide.  
The legacy of these words was applied to both the IRS whistleblower 
program, as amended in 2006, and the SEC whistleblower program under 
Dodd-Frank, each of which provide bounties to whistleblowers who are 
complicit in the wrongdoings for which they are reporting.  Both federal 
agencies have decided not to exclude culpable whistleblowers from being 
eligible for a bounty, but they diverge with respect to making bounties 
available to whistleblowers who are criminally convicted.  The SEC 
whistleblower program follows the False Claims Act model in that it will 
 
 259.  Id. at 683. 
 260.  Id. 
 261.  Id.   
 262.  Id. 
 263.  See supra Section II.B.  
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outright deny a bounty to any convict,264 and, for a whistleblower who 
participated in the wrongdoing but was not convicted, will reduce the 
amount of the bounty based on such person’s level of involvement.265  In 
contrast, the IRS will allow bounties even for criminally convicted 
whistleblowers as long as they were not convicted because they “planned 
and initiated” the wrongdoing.266 
Bradley Birkenfeld’s contributions as a whistleblower were invaluable 
in bringing one of the most significant tax frauds to light, leading to 
initiatives that helped the U.S. government tap into the recesses of Swiss 
bank secrecy.267  Despite Birkenfeld’s legal battle for immunity, he was 
denied this opportunity for failure to disclose the extent of his criminal 
involvement.268  Birkenfeld’s $104 million bounty is controversial and 
threatens long-standing legal principles holding that convicts should be 
precluded from financially benefitting from their misdeeds.269 
This Article has suggested that the incentives of leniency and 
immunity already inherent in SEC and IRS programs provide enough of an 
incentive to whistleblowers who are likely to be successfully prosecuted, 
with Bradley Birkenfeld’s story being a case in point.  By amending the 
IRS whistleblower program to follow that of the SEC model, Congress 
would more closely adhere to the legacy of the False Claims Act––the 
statute upon which the present-day IRS program is based and that denies 
bounties to whistleblowers who are criminally convicted.  Such 
amendments would also eliminate the lack of clarity stemming from the 
IRS whistleblower program’s current use of the “planning and initiating” 
limitation, which differentiates those who are denied a bounty outright 
because of a conviction for this role from those who are not.270  
Commentators have already begun to critique the way in which the IRS 
makes this determination, citing its lack of guidance and divergence from 
comparable reporting systems.271 
Finally, this Article has acknowledged the distinctions between the 
areas of tax and securities law but has challenged any possible 
counterarguments that may critique this Article’s position based on these 
differences.  Recent trends have revealed that the SEC has emerged as a 
“punisher” utilizing investigatory and enforcement tools that are more akin 
to its criminal counterparts, such as the IRS and the Department of 
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Justice.272  Such trends suggest that perhaps the SEC and IRS are not so 
different after all, especially in light of the significant need of both agencies 
to be informed of fraud and other violations of the law. 
Martin Luther King Jr. once eloquently expressed that “[h]e who 
passively accepts evil is as much involved in it as he who helps to 
perpetrate it.  He who accepts evil without protesting against it is really 
cooperating with it.”273  These words tell us that even silence is complicity, 
which may suggest that an individual who observes wrongdoing in silence, 
taking no action, may have the same level of fault as a participator in the 
wrongdoing who then reveals it.  For this reason, culpable whistleblowers 
should be acknowledged and rewarded for the inside information that only 
they can provide, but with caution.  Barring the criminally convicted––
persons who have undergone criminal prosecution resulting in an 
ascertainment of guilt––from whistleblower bounties is likely to be a 
reasonable solution to the conflict between incentivizing those with unclean 
hands to inform the government of fraud and avoiding the possibility that 
their motivations are merely premised on the promise of potentially 
millions of dollars. 
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